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ABSTRACT 
 
Edward S. Sul: Takeover Threats, Job Security Concerns, and Earnings Management  
(Under the direction of Robert M. Bushman and Mark H. Lang) 
 
I exploit the international, staggered adoption of takeover laws in order to examine the 
effect of increased turnover sensitivity to performance on managers’ financial reporting choices. 
Using a difference-in-difference design, I find that the enactment of laws designed to promote 
takeover activity is associated with greater earnings management (abnormally high accruals, 
small positive earnings, discretionary earnings smoothing and poor accruals quality) and greater 
opacity (reduced analyst forecast accuracy and following and greater forecast dispersion). This is 
consistent with managers responding to increased risk of termination by distorting earnings 
information. As predicted, results are particularly pronounced for managers with the highest ex 
ante risk of termination and at firms with poor performance. The effects are mitigated in 
countries in which strong institutions limit the CEOs’ ability to manage earnings and create 
opacity. Overall, my results suggest that reforms aimed at enhancing governance through higher 
turnover sensitivity to performance encourage earnings management and opacity by increasing 
job security concerns.  
 
 
 
iv 
 
To Mom, Dad, and my loving wife, Dasol 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I am grateful to my dissertation committee for their guidance and support: Robert 
Bushman (co-chair), Mark Lang (co-chair), Bradley Hendricks, Eva Labro, Wayne Landsman, 
and Christian Lundblad.  I thank workshop participants at the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill, University of Virginia, Indiana University, University of Texas at Austin, Baruch 
College, University of Colorado at Boulder, Santa Clara University, George Washington 
University, and University of Houston for their valuable comments and feedback.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………………………...viii 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………1 
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES…………………………………………..9 
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY……………………………………………………………….16 
 Section 3.1: Sample……………………………………………………………………...16 
 Section 3.2: Research Design……………………………………………………………17 
 Section 3.3: Dependent Variables……………………………………………………….17 
  Section 3.3.1: Earnings Management……………………………………………18 
Sect ion 3.3.2:  Analyst  Forecast  Propert ies………………………………………21 
Sect ion  3 .4:  Descr ip t ive  S tat i s t i cs……………………………………………….22 
CHAPTER 4: MAIN RESULTS………………………………………………………………...23 
Section 4.1: Comparison of Earnings Management……………………………………..23 
Section 4.2: Comparison of Analyst Forecast Properties………………………………..24 
Section 4.3: Robustness of Main Results………………………………………………..25 
Section 4.4: Job Security Concerns……………………………………………………..27 
CHAPTER 5: ADDITIONAL TESTS………...…………………………………………………31 
Section 5.1: Institutional Split…………………………………………………………..31 
vii 
 
Section 5.2: Rapid Investment and Growth……………………………………………32 
Section 5.3: Share Issuances…………………………………………………………...34 
Section 5.4: Additional Controls for Confounding Channels………………………….34 
CHAPTER 6: ROBUSTNESS ANALYSES…………………………………………………….36 
Section 6.1: Other Transparency Proxies………………………………………………36 
Section 6.2: Reduced Sample Period…………………………………………………..38 
Section 6.3: Pre-2004 Sample………………………………………………………….38 
Section 6.4: Dropping the Treatment Year and Year Before Treatment Year…………39 
Section 6.5: Dropping Countries One By One…………………………………………40 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………..41 
APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES……………………………………………..44 
REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………………………..69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: List of Countries and Takeover Laws…………………………………………………..47 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics…………………………………………………………………...48 
Table 3: Takeover Laws and Earnings Management…………………………………………….49 
Table 4: Takeover Laws and Analyst Forecast Properties……………………………………….51 
Table 5: Robustness of Main Results…………………………………………………………….53 
Table 6: Takeover Laws and Opacity – Performance Splits……………………………..............54 
Table 7: Takeover Laws and Opacity – CEO Turnover Risk Splits……………………………..58 
Table 8: Takeover Laws and Opacity – Investor Protection Splits……………………...............60 
Table 9: Takeover Laws and Opacity – Growth Strategy Splits………………………...............61 
Table 10: Takeover Laws and Opacity – Share Issuance Splits…………………………………63 
Table 11: Controls for Confounding Channels…………………………………………………..65 
Table 12: Other Transparency Proxies…………………………………………………..............67 
Table 13: Sensitivity Analyses…………………………………………………………...............68   
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance is essential to mitigating agency problems and maximizing firm 
value. Strong governance helps align managers’ incentives with those of shareholders (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). The potential benefits of improved corporate governance may lead politicians 
and regulators to adopt reforms designed to enhance the governance of firms domiciled within a 
country. Despite the potential benefits, governance reforms may generate unintended negative 
consequences. In this paper, I document an example of such unintended negative consequences – 
increased earnings management and financial reporting opacity – by exploiting the staggered 
adoption of country-level takeover legislation.1 These laws promote takeover activity within a 
country by reducing barriers to mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transactions, encouraging 
information dissemination, expanding disclosure, enhancing governance and increasing minority 
shareholder protection.2 I provide evidence that CEOs manage earnings and create financial 
reporting opacity in response to heightened concerns about job security as a result of these 
governance-enhancing regulations.3
                                                     
1 I follow Bushman et al. (2004) in defining opacity as the unavailability of firm-specific information to those 
outside publicly traded firms. While both earnings management and analyst forecast properties represent financial 
reporting transparency (e.g., Lang et al., 2012; Maffett, 2012), I refer to earnings management separately from 
‘transparency’ as represented by analyst forecast properties in this paper since earnings management is a direct 
manager choice in response to legislation and is my primary focus within this study. I complement this with analyst 
forecast properties within my analyses in order to confirm that the information environment has indeed deteriorated.  
 
2 For instance, the Code on Takeovers and Mergers of Malaysia announced the strengthening of investor protection, 
instituting of higher standards of governance in takeovers, enhancing transparency and improving efficiency as its 
key objectives (Khan and Bibi, 2015). 
 
3 I use the term “job security concerns” throughout this paper to describe managers’ concerns about losing their jobs.  
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Increased takeover pressures created by a shock, such as M&A legislation, affect 
governance both directly through the threat of takeover and indirectly through changes in a 
firm’s internal governance mechanisms (e.g., Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Among the 
key components of strong internal governance is the ability of the board to fire poorly 
performing managers. In this regard, Lel and Miller (2015) examine takeover laws and find 
direct evidence that the sensitivity of turnover to performance significantly increases following a 
country’s adoption of legislation that increases the threat of takeover.  
 An increase in turnover sensitivity to performance places pressure on CEOs, who fear 
termination if they do not perform. This pressure can create incentives to manipulate information 
in order to improve the impression that CEOs make on monitors (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). 
When boards and outside investors emphasize accounting information in evaluating a manager, it 
can exacerbate incentives to manage earnings or hide behind opacity. Furthermore, Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2012) posit that more disclosure and the associated increases in monitoring and 
scrutiny adversely affect managers’ job security and incentivize them to engage in value-
reducing activities in order to appear more able.4 These value-reducing activities include the 
intentional distortion of accounting information. 
However, an enhanced governance mechanism such as turnover sensitivity to 
performance could also lead to an improved information environment. Provided the costs of 
earnings management and opacity to outside investors (e.g., Leuz et al., 2003; Burgstahler et al., 
2006; Lang et al., 2012), boards have incentives to discipline earnings management in addition to 
                                                     
4 Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) note that any shock that affects disclosure can affect managers’ decisions to distort 
earnings information. My assumption is that international takeover laws shock both the disclosure regime and job 
security concerns. As the goal of these laws is to expand the market for corporate control within a country, the 
promoted laws expand disclosures in order to stimulate takeover activity (Nenova, 2006). Increased job security 
concerns follow as a result of the increased monitoring and scrutiny (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012) and turnover 
sensitivity to performance (Lel and Miller, 2015). 
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poor performance. Hazarika et al. (2012) posit that the proactive monitoring of earnings 
management dissuades CEOs from distorting accounting information to serve their own interests. 
Moreover, takeover laws were intended to enhance transparency, disclosure and governance in 
order to attract potential acquirers so that the board could be expected to further monitor the 
production of high quality accounting information.  
Thus, boards may desire to limit earnings manipulation via strong governance. However, 
the complete elimination of earnings management and opacity is unlikely to be optimal at a firm 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012) and directors likely bear a cost for detecting such manipulations. 
As such, the effect of an enhanced governance mechanism, such as turnover sensitivity to 
performance, on earnings management and opacity remains an empirical question. This paper 
addresses this question by examining changes in information quality around the time at which 
takeover laws were enacted.  
The sample includes observations from 33 countries, 13 of which passed a takeover law 
between 1995 and 2004. I exploit the staggered adoption of these country-level laws as a 
plausibly exogenous shock to CEO turnover sensitivity to performance, based on the results 
presented in Lel and Miller (2015). Leuz and Wysocki (2015) argue that cases of staggered 
implementation of regulation, especially if the dates are exogenously determined, provide a 
robust understanding of the consequences of laws. As such, I employ a difference-in-difference 
design to compare changes in financial reporting characteristics for firms in countries that passed 
takeover laws with firms in countries that never passed such laws. I focus on two characteristics: 
earnings management and analyst forecast properties. Earnings management is a direct response 
by managers pressured to deliver high performance and analyst forecast properties represent an 
outcome-based measure of transparency (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Lang et al., 2012). 
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Results indicate that firms engage in significantly more earnings management activities 
and become significantly more opaque following their country’s adoption of takeover legislation. 
Specifically, firms are more likely to discretionarily smooth earnings, report small positive 
income, have worse accruals quality, and utilize abnormally high accruals in the post-M&A law 
period. Furthermore, analyst following decreases, analyst forecast accuracy worsens and analyst 
forecast dispersion increases. The results are robust to both a country, industry and year fixed 
effects specification and a firm and year fixed effects specification. 
Findings also suggest that the increased job security concerns – as a result of takeover 
law initiation – and the associated increases in turnover sensitivity to performance incentivize 
managers to pursue earnings management and opacity. Managers with poorer market or 
accounting performance at the time of takeover legislation engage in significantly more earnings 
management and have worse analyst forecast properties following the legislation than do 
managers with good performance. Furthermore, I use international officer data to directly 
calculate ex ante turnover probability. In doing this, I find that managers with higher turnover 
risk at the time of takeover legislation subsequently decrease information quality significantly 
more than managers with low turnover probability. As such, the results are most pronounced for 
managers expected to have greater job security concerns following a shock to turnover 
sensitivity to performance – i.e. those who had been delivering poor performance or have 
inherently higher turnover risk.  
Moreover, I find that having high quality country-level institutions help limit managers’ 
opportunities to worsen their information environments. Using sample partitions based on the 
anti-self-dealing index and common vs. code law as my measures of country-level investor 
protection, I demonstrate by inter-country comparison that lower investor protection makes 
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opportunistic manipulation of accounting information following takeover law initiation easier. 
Thus, although the incentives for managers who are concerned about job security to distort 
accounting information are likely widespread, countries with strong institutions can combat 
potentially negative consequences on the information environment.  
I conduct a number of sensitivity analyses to provide support for my inferences. I find 
that growth strategies and share issuances are not viable alternative explanations for higher 
earnings management and opacity, based on cross-sectional tests that split the sample on these 
measures. These findings mitigate the concern that the deterioration of the information 
environment reflects a change other than increased job security concerns which incentivizes 
CEOs to manipulate earnings. My inferences do not change when including controls for other 
potentially confounding channels (e.g., short selling laws). Furthermore, my inferences are 
robust to including country-specific time trends, bootstrapping for statistical significance and 
using a control sample matched on size and performance, which lend support to the assumptions 
of the difference-in-difference estimation and to the validity of my research design. My 
inferences are also robust when employing alternate transparency proxies, different sample 
periods and various sample compositions. 
 My study contributes to existing literature in several ways. First, it contributes to the 
governance literature by providing evidence of an unexpected and negative effect of regulations 
that enhance a key governance mechanism. Using a unique, international setting in which firms 
experience a positive shock to turnover sensitivity to performance, an important internal 
governance mechanism, my study documents a subsequent increase in earnings management and 
opacity that is connected to greater turnover pressures on managers. This result indicates that 
although increasing turnover sensitivity to performance in order to ensure managers act in 
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shareholders’ interests and perform well can be beneficial, it is important to also consider the 
resulting incentives for managers to obfuscate accounting information.  
 This paper also contributes to the takeover literature by using a set of staggered country-
level takeover laws as a plausibly exogenous shock to takeover threats in order to document an 
unintended increase in earnings management and opacity. Prior studies (e.g., Mikkelson and 
Parch, 1997; Gompers et al., 2003; Baber et al., 2015) use takeover defenses or occurrences of 
completed or attempted takeovers as proxies for takeover threats. However, such studies are 
subject to endogeneity concerns because firms themselves establish takeover defenses. 
Moreover, completed or attempted takeovers occur because of characteristics of the firm itself. I 
mitigate these endogeneity concerns by using a set of takeover laws that serve as a shock to 
takeover threats in that countries rather than firm characteristics determine the laws’ enactment.5 
This study is the first to use international M&A laws to explore firms’ responses to heightened 
takeover threats with respect to financial reporting choices. 
A third contribution of this research applies to the investor protection literature. I find 
that the increased earnings management and opacity following takeover legislation is more 
pronounced for firms in countries with poor quality institutions. This suggests that undesirable 
consequences exist mainly in environments in which managers have not only greater incentives, 
but also better opportunities for manipulating accounting information. Thus, I identify strong 
institutions as a mechanism through which countries can limit the ability of CEOs to distort 
accounting information for their private benefit. Although prior literature provides evidence that 
                                                     
5 U.S. state antitakeover laws have been used as an exogenous measure of decreased takeover threats, but Karpoff 
and Wittry (2015) indicate that these laws are strongly affected by corporate lobbying. On the other hand, it is 
difficult to imagine that firms lobby regulators at the country level in order to increase the likelihood of becoming a 
takeover target. Nonetheless, I discuss studies that examine the effect of state antitakeover laws on information 
quality in greater detail later within this section.  
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strong investor protection is negatively associated with earnings management and opacity (e.g. 
Leuz et al., 2003), this paper illuminates the importance of institutions in a setting in which they 
help to mitigate undesired consequences of regulations. This is useful for policymakers who seek 
to improve governance mechanisms, such as performance monitoring, without enabling 
managers concerned about job security to manipulate accounting information.  
In a related study, Armstrong et al. (2012) exploit a set of U.S. state antitakeover laws 
and examine their effect on transparency. The study provides evidence that, following the 
decrease in takeover threats from these laws, firms’ financial reporting quality improves. My 
paper extends and complements Armstrong et al. (2012) in several ways. First, I provide 
international evidence of the link between takeover threats and information quality. This is 
significant since the existing U.S. literature on this relation is mixed (e.g. Bowen et al., 2008; 
Zhao and Chen, 2009; Armstrong et al., 2012; Baber et al., 2015). This paper offers a new take 
on this relation using a novel international takeover law setting.  
More importantly, I isolate job security concerns as a channel through which takeover 
law implementation influences managers’ accounting choices. Prior literature does not directly 
examine this channel, although Armstrong et al. (2012) partition their sample on ex-ante 
probability of takeover, finding no differences in transparency across partitions. In the 
international sample used in this paper, I also find no significant differences in financial 
reporting quality when partitioning based on ex-ante takeover probability. However, I further 
investigate concerns about turnover using ex ante performance and turnover probability. Here, I 
provide direct evidence that job security concerns serve as a channel. Additionally, I find that the 
increase in earnings management and opacity following takeover law adoption is more 
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pronounced for the CEOs who are expected to have higher job security concerns at the time of 
takeover legislation – poor performers and those with greater turnover risks. 
It is also possible that a turnover-driven explanation is masked in the U.S. setting. 
Because the US has strong investor protection, even if job security concerns create incentives to 
manipulate accounting information, the country’s institutions limit CEOs’ ability to do so. The 
cross-country sample thus illuminates the influence of takeover laws in conjunction with varying 
degrees of investor protection. This allows for the exploitation of greater variation in firm level 
characteristics, such as earnings management. As a result, I am able to identify job security 
concerns as a channel through which takeover laws impact the information environment; this 
result is more pronounced in low investor protection countries.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background 
information on the setting and related literature. Section 3 describes the research design, 
methodology and relevant variables. Section 4 details the main results and robustness analyses 
with regard to the estimation assumptions, as well as an explanation for the results. Section 5 
presents the results of a number of additional tests that further support my results. This section 
also conducts cross-sectional tests in order to disentangle potential drivers of the results. Section 
6 contains a number of robustness analyses. Section 7 concludes. 
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2.  BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Corporate governance is important because of the inherent agency problems present 
when managers are separated from outside investors (Bushman and Smith, 2001). In particular, 
managers may pursue their private interests – which do not align with the shareholders’ interests 
but are often protected by legal mechanisms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Corporate governance 
protects shareholders’ interests and their investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and existing 
literature documents that governance can significantly affect firm value.6  
The components of corporate governance examined within prior literature include 
turnover sensitivity to performance (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Volpin, 2002; DeFond and 
Hung, 2004; Lel and Miller, 2015). With such mechanisms in place, CEOs, especially those who 
are underperforming, are under higher pressure and face greater job security concerns. Thus, 
while improving sensitivity of turnover to performance may increase managerial effort, it can 
also increase incentives to manage performance measures and create an opaque information 
environment.  
Prior literature provides evidence that job security concerns can encourage attempts to 
distort the information by which managers are being evaluated (e.g. DeAngelo, 1988; Graham et 
al., 2005; Mergenthaler et al., 2012; Ali and Zhang, 2015). Given that CEOs are incentivized to 
manipulate information to signal their quality (Adams and Ferreira, 2007), a shock to turnover 
sensitivity to performance that increases job security concerns for CEOs could magnify these 
                                                     
6 Papers that examine components of governance and their benefits on firm value include Gompers et al. (2003), 
Masulis et al. (2007) and Bebchuk et al. (2009). 
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incentives. Further, Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) discuss in their theoretical paper how CEOs 
can manipulate reporting quality following a shock to the disclosure regime, and the associated 
increase in scrutiny imposes more monitoring, which place greater job security concerns on 
managers. Thus, managers may have incentives to manipulate the accounting information that is 
used in their evaluation and hide behind opacity.  
Thus, an improvement in corporate governance mechanisms, such as turnover sensitivity 
to performance, increases job security concerns for CEOs. Moreover, manipulation of accounting 
information is not restricted to upwards earnings manipulation or to one period. Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1995) and DeFond and Park (1997) argue that job security concerns drive managers to 
smooth earnings in consideration of both current and future performance, suggesting the 
presence of both upwards manipulation for current poor performers and smoothing for those who 
are more concerned about future performance.  
On the other hand, turnover sensitivity to performance is a key internal governance 
mechanism. Improved governance can also curb earnings management and opacity, which are 
not innocuous; they are costly to outside investors and may only benefit the CEOs (e.g., Leuz et 
al., 2003; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Lang et al., 2012). As a result, boards have incentives to not 
only monitor performance, but also to discipline financial reporting choices. Thus, enhanced 
governance mechanisms could discourage CEOs from engaging in earnings management or 
hiding behind opacity. Hazarika et al. (2012) confirm that proactive disciplining of aggressive 
earnings management exists and they present evidence that such disciplining influences CEOs’ 
behavior. Other studies within the literature suggest that better corporate governance structures 
help mitigate earnings management, although most of the structures examined were board 
composition measures rather than specific attributes, such as the ability to fire poorly performing 
11 
 
managers (e.g., Beasley, 1996; Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Davidson et al., 2005).7 
Nevertheless, earnings management detection imposes costs on boards (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2012), so it may not be common. Whether managers’ incentives to obfuscate accounting 
information to save their jobs outplay directors’ efforts to deter earnings management and ensure 
transparent financial reporting is an empirical question that I investigate in this study. 
I use the market for corporate control as the research setting, because the threat of 
takeover is an important governance mechanism itself and also enhances attributes such as a 
CEO’s turnover sensitivity to firm performance (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1998; Lel and Miller, 2015). For my primary analyses, I utilize a set of 
M&A laws passed in 13 countries between 1992 and 2009 from Lel and Miller (2005), which 
they gathered from sources including financial law publications such as the International 
Comparative Legal Guide and International Financial Law Review, papers such as Nenova 
(2006) and websites of national regulatory agencies.8 These laws were passed in order to foster 
M&A activity, presumably to attract more capital into the country’s stock market, improve the 
country’s global standing and promote more efficient capital allocation by emphasizing the 
reduction of barriers to M&As.  
Table 1 lists the 13 countries in the treatment sample and the years of takeover law 
initiation as well as the 20 countries in the control sample.9 The countries passed laws between 
                                                     
7 Moreover, Bushman and Smith (2003) state that firms that improve governance could also increase disclosure, 
improve transparency and reduce information asymmetry, which are associated with capital market benefits. 
 
8 Lel and Miller (2015) exclude Switzerland, which passed a takeover law in 2004 and end their sample in 
2003,because of the EU Takeovers Directive that was passed in April 2004. However, research reveals that the 
effects of this law on takeovers are ambiguous (e.g., Humphery-Jenner, 2012). Thus, to maximize my treatment 
sample and firm-year observations, I include the 2004 Switzerland law and extend the sample into 2009. I later also 
exclude Switzerland and end the sample in 2003 and find that this does not affect my results.  
 
9 Although Lel and Miller (2015) include Czech Republic as a country within the control group, I exclude 
observations from the Czech Republic because the country has insufficient observations according to the criteria I 
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1995 and 2004, ultimately providing a set of staggered adoptions that help mitigate endogeneity 
issues. I exclude countries that passed takeover laws prior to the beginning of the sample period 
(1992) in order to isolate the effect of these laws and the resulting increase in performance 
monitoring on financial reporting. An advantage to using such a set of laws is that the decision to 
pass takeover legislation and dates of enactment are exogenously determined. It is difficult to 
imagine that firms have a role in the adoption of these country-level laws.10 Thus, I provide a 
nice setting in which I can better identify causal effects of such legislation using a difference-in-
difference design with an appropriate control group that consists of countries that had never 
passed takeover laws.  
Prior literature is mixed regarding the relation between takeover threats and earnings 
quality. While Zhao and Chen (2008, 2009) and Armstrong et al. (2012) find that takeover 
defenses – which lower the threat of takeover – improve earnings quality, Bowen et al. (2008) 
and Baber et al. (2015) provide evidence that decreased takeover threats is consistent with higher 
discretionary accounting practices and misreporting of financial statements, respectively. This 
relation is not documented in a cross-country setting however, and it may be important to 
examine other countries in order to illuminate this link and better understand why such a relation 
occurs. 
This paper complements and extends Armstrong et al. (2012), who exploit a set of U.S. 
state antitakeover laws and provide evidence that firms’ financial reporting quality improves 
                                                     
use. However, as a robustness check, I include observations from the Czech Republic in my control sample and find 
that inferences do not change.  
 
10 Prior literature, such as Mikkelson and Partch (1997) and Gompers et al. (2003), use the level of takeover activity 
and takeover defenses, respectively, as proxies for takeover threats. However, target firms’ characteristics and 
macroeconomic shocks that jointly explain the variables under study affect the level of takeover activity. Moreover, 
firms implement takeover defenses themselves and thus, suffer from endogeneity concerns. Turnover sensitivity to 
performance levels suffers from endogeneity concerns for the same reasons, since firms themselves can choose how 
much performance should impact managerial turnover decisions.  
13 
 
following implementation. Although Armstrong et al. (2012) find that their results can be 
explained by firms’ need to access the capital markets, they do not specifically test the job 
security concerns story. However, Bertrand and Mullainathan (1998) also use antitakeover laws 
and document a reduction of pressure on top managers, thus lowering managers’ incentives to 
distort accounting information (Bushman and Smith, 2001), it is important to examine the role 
played by job security concerns, or turnover pressure. Although Armstrong et al. (2012) provide 
evidence that there are no differences in transparency between subsamples partitioned on ex ante 
takeover risk, I use measures that directly represent turnover pressure in the face of increasing 
turnover sensitivity to performance, such as performance itself or turnover probability.11 The 
relation between takeover risks and information quality directly driven by changing turnover 
pressures is not directly investigated in prior U.S. studies that examine this relation. 
In contrast, the current paper examines takeover laws which increase takeover threats. A 
number of provisions in the international M&A laws resemble those in the US, including fair 
price laws (Connecticut), registration and disclosure laws (Hawaii) and cash-out laws 
(Pennsylvania). The provisions also include unique provisions. For instance, Taiwan grants large 
tax benefits to acquirers through new types of M&As like cross-border and cash-out mergers. 
New Zealand allows acquirers to squeeze out minority shareholders. While the Philippines 
                                                     
11 Using my international sample, I also partition based on ex ante takeover risk, calculated by applying a takeover 
prediction model I built for each observation in my sample. The takeover prediction model is created by regressing 
instances of becoming a takeover target, collected from SDC Platinum: Mergers and Acquisitions database, on a set 
of determinants of becoming a takeover target from prior literature such as Cremers et al. (2009), which include 
Tobin’s Q, PP&E, leverage, cash, and ROA, all country-industry adjusted; as well as size, presence of institutional 
investors, and M&A intensity of the industry. Untabulated results indicate that there are no significant differences in 
earnings management or analyst forecast properties across ex ante takeover risk partitions. 
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simplified government approval procedures, India eliminated certain takeover defenses; as a 
result, these factors promote greater takeover activity in these countries.12 
Such attempts at fostering greater M&A activity can create distinct incentives. Because 
they increase pressure on top management, they generate incentives to manage earnings and 
create an opaque information environment. This concept of pressure faced by management is 
especially relevant in a setting in which turnover sensitivity to reported performance increases 
(Lel and Miller, 2015). Furthermore, I use a broad international setting in which the wide 
variation in country institutions and in firm transparency can also be exploited. These aspects are 
difficult to exploit in a U.S. setting, in which all firms face a similar institutional environment. 
For instance, CEOs worldwide may have similar incentives to distort performance measures, but 
countries with high quality institutions could limit the abilities of these managers to execute the 
distortions. As such, inter-country studies clarify these incentives in distinct institutional 
environments.  
To examine the incentives that drive managers to manipulate earnings following takeover 
law enactment, I use a firm’s ex ante market and accounting performance to separate managers 
who are performing poorly from those who are performing well, as performance is a primary 
determinant of forced CEO turnover. This addresses the hypothesis that managers performing 
poorly have greater job security concerns and have higher incentives to manage earnings when 
turnover sensitivity to performance increases. To emphasize the relationship between my 
findings and turnover pressure, I gather annual data on companies’ officers from Worldscope CD 
                                                     
12 Although the laws differ in terms of what provisions they include, neither Lel and Miller (2015) nor I are 
concerned with the potentially heterogeneous effects each law might have on takeover threats. We recognize that all 
of these laws had the intention to, and did increase, takeover activity, which in turn increases turnover sensitivity to 
performance and hence, job security concerns. The effects on takeover activity are untabulated within this paper, but 
are included in Lel and Miller (2015) as well as in their online appendix.  
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ROMs and build a turnover prediction model using a set of determinants for forced turnover. I 
apply the model to each firm in my sample in order to calculate a direct measure of ex ante 
turnover pressure, and divide the sample in two based on the median of this measure. This 
directly tests my job security concerns hypothesis and examines whether CEOs with higher 
turnover pressure manage earnings and render financial reporting opaque at a higher rate than 
those under less pressure. 
Competing hypotheses include growth strategies and share issuance. Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003) and Zhao and Chen (2008) suggest that managers pursue the quiet life after 
state antitakeover laws are passed. I investigate the possibility that the opposite occurs after the 
adoption of takeover laws – that cash flow uncertainty from higher investments and growth 
strategies increases opacity. Furthermore, Teoh et al. (1998a, b) and Ducharme et al. (2004) 
suggest that managers who issue shares could have incentives to manipulate accounting 
information in order to maximize share price. Therefore, I also examine the possibility that the 
increased opacity following M&A law adoption is driven by firms planning to create optimism 
about their prospects prior to issuing equity. 
The analysis begins with an exploration of whether takeover laws that heighten takeover 
threats increase or decrease the information quality of a country’s firms. I then conduct various 
cross-sectional tests to understand what might drive this relation. Because I examine a cross-
country sample, I also explore whether stronger investor protection can help mitigate the 
increased levels of earnings management and opacity in firms domiciled in countries that passed 
M&A laws. Although research has studied the effects of the international market for corporate 
control on governance (Lel and Miller, 2015), it has not addressed the effects on transparency or 
why those effects occur. The current study addresses this gap. 
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3.  METHODOLOGY 
3.1 SAMPLE 
The sample comes from the Worldscope database between the years of 1992 and 2009.13 
I exclude all of the firms that are not in one of the 33 treatment and sample countries. All of the 
firms in the sample have observations in the three years prior to and following M&A law 
adoption, which eliminates firms created in the post-law period and firms that became inactive in 
the pre-law period.14 The firms in the control countries have at least seven observations each.15 
From there, I adjust my sample size depending on the set of required variables for the particular 
regression.16 For my main regressions, the sample size ranges from 29,327 firm-year 
observations to 52,692 firm-year observations.  
 
 
                                                     
13 The sample period begins in 1992 because Worldscope coverage of international firms is poor prior to 1990, and I 
require up to three years of financial data to calculate certain earnings management measures such as discretionary 
smoothing. I chose 2009 as the end of the sample period because that allows up to five years of outcomes following 
the last regulation I use (Switzerland in 2004). In robustness tests, I use a sample period ending prior to 2004 to 
avoid certain confounding events, such as the 2004 EU Takeover Directive, 2005 Mandatory IFRS adoption and the 
2008 financial crisis. Inferences remain the same as those from the alternative sample period.  
 
14 Relaxing the requirement of having at least three pre-law and three post-law observations does not change the 
inferences. I also run a balanced panel in those years and the conclusions remain the same.  
 
15 This is to mirror the requirement of the treatment firms, which require three pre-law observations: one observation 
in the year of law enactment and three post-law observations, for a total of at least seven observations per firm. Also, 
relaxing this requirement for the control sample does not lead to qualitatively different conclusions.  
 
16 I allow the sample size to change depending on the model in order to preserve sample size when possible. 
Inferences remain the same when I drop any observation without the required observations for any of the regressions 
in order to use a consistent sample size across all of the main regressions. 
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3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
I utilize a series of difference-in-difference estimations to examine how M&A law 
adoption affects a firm’s financial reporting characteristics. The model is as follows:  
 
 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT = α + β1 * (TREAT*POST) + β2 * (X) + Fixed Effects 
 OR ANALYST FORECAST 
 PROPERTIES 
 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT and ANALYST FORECAST PROPERTIES represent the dependent 
variables that I describe below. TREAT is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is in 
one of the 13 countries that enact takeover laws and zero otherwise, and POST is an indicator 
variable that equals one if the observation is from the post-law period and zero otherwise. The 
interaction between TREAT*POST is the main explanatory variable, and the coefficient, β1, is 
negative (positive) if the laws decrease (increase) information quality for the treatment firms 
more than they decrease (increase)  information quality for the control firms from the pre- to 
post-law period. X is a set of control variables also expected to have effects on earnings 
management or on analyst forecast properties. All of the regressions include country, industry 
and year fixed effects, so I do not include TREAT and POST in my model. Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level in order to correct for possible serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity, following Lel and Miller (2015). All of the continuous, unranked and 
nonlogarithmic variables are truncated at the 1% level.  
3.3 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Because transparency is not directly observable and prior studies have used a variety of 
measures, I use various proxies to examine how takeover law initiations affect a firm’s 
information environment. I include both the firm’s transparency-related decisions (earnings 
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management) and transparency outcomes (analyst forecast properties) to investigate CEO’s 
direct responses to takeover laws and to understand in-depth how M&A legislation affects a 
firm’s information environment, respectively. Detailed descriptions for all of the variables 
appear in Appendix A.  
3.3.1 Earnings Management 
I use four different proxies, each capturing a different aspect of earnings management, as 
well as an aggregate measure of financial reporting quality. I allow for CEOs to use distinct 
methods of earnings management to suit their needs, depending on their specific circumstances. I 
investigate discretionary smoothing (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995), target beating (Graham et al., 
2005), unsigned accruals quality and signed abnormal accruals levels since accruals are likely 
used to directly manipulate earnings. Because of measurement error associated with a single 
earnings management proxy, I examine multiple earnings management variables in order to 
cover a broad spectrum of manipulation methods. 
The first measure, discretionary smoothing (DIS_SMTHC), is a combination of two 
commonly used variables which represent earnings management – variability of net income 
relative to cash flow and the correlation between accruals and cash flows (e.g., Leuz et al., 2003; 
Barth et al., 2008; Lang et al., 2012). The intuition is that the discretionary use of accruals to 
smooth out fluctuations in underlying cash flows beyond an inherent amount indicates the 
presence of earnings management. To capture this direct smoothing with the purpose of 
managing earnings (as opposed to firm fundamentals affecting income variability), I follow Lang 
et al. (2012) in regressing the smoothing measure on a set of firm fundamentals and assume that 
the residual represents discretionary smoothing.  
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The second proxy represents instances of small positive income (SPINC), a dummy 
variable that equals one if net income scaled by total assets is between 0 and 0.01, and zero 
otherwise (e.g., Srinivasan et al., 2015).17 Prior literature documents a “kink” in the distribution 
of reported earnings around zero: a statistically small number of firms with small losses and a 
statistically large number of firms with small profits, suggesting that many firms around this 
heuristic target of “zero” manage their earnings so as to report a profit and avoid a loss (e.g., 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Beaver et al., 2003; Dechow et al., 2010). I also investigate 
meeting or beating analyst forecasts and prior period earnings as alternative proxies for target 
beating and inferences are unaffected (untabulated). 
Third, I use the Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure of accruals quality (DDEQ), the 
standard deviation of residuals from a regression of accruals on current, past and future cash 
flows. Dechow and Dichev (2002) find an association between this standard deviation and poor 
accruals quality. Thus, researchers widely use this measure as a proxy for earnings management, 
including within the international literature (e.g., Barth et al., 2012).  
Lastly, I use a measure that represents signed abnormal accruals (ABNACCR), which is 
the difference between a firm’s accruals for a given year and the firm’s predicted accruals 
following DeFond and Park (2001) and Francis and Wang (2008). Unlike the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) accruals quality measure, this measure of abnormal accruals is signed.  Thus, 
ABNACCR can provide insight into a firm’s tendency towards upward or downward earnings 
management. Thus, a more positive measure of ABNACCR represents an abnormally upward-
                                                     
17 My measure is different from Srinivasan et al.’s [2015] measure, which takes the percentage of firm-years in the 
past three years in which net income scaled by total assets was between 0 and 0.01. I do not take a three-year 
average because of the event study nature of my analysis. For instance, using a one-year measure avoids 
confounding effects of pre-law small positive income instances on the firm’s three-year small positive income 
proportion within the year following takeover law adoption. I use Srinivasan et al.’s [2015] three-year measure to 
check for robustness, however, and my inferences are not affected.  
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leaning earnings management via the manipulation of accruals, indicating greater instances of 
accruals and earnings inflation.18  
Because each of these four measures represents a different type of earnings management 
(discretionary smoothing, target beating, accruals quality and inflation), I also examine an 
aggregate measure of financial reporting quality (FRQ). This measure represents the average 
ranks of each of these earnings management variables (Lang et al, 2012).19 Before averaging the 
variable ranks, I adjust the signs so that increasing FRQ values correspond with increasing 
financial reporting quality, or decreasing earnings management.20 Aggregating different proxies 
for earnings management provides greater intuition into how overall financial reporting quality 
changes following the adoption of takeover laws than if I were to depend on a single, noisy 
dimension of earnings management.21 
I include a number of variables to control for firm fundamentals that prior literature 
explains are also associated with earnings management. The control variables include firm size 
(LNTOTASS), the natural log of total assets (in USD), book to market ratio (BM), return on assets 
(ROA), standard deviation of returns (STDRETURN), an indicator variable for an “old” firm if 
the firm’s age is above the sample median (OLD), yearly growth in sales (SGROWTH), an 
                                                     
18 Alternative proxies for discretionary accruals, such as the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) or 
discretionary estimation errors (Francis et al, 2005) do not change inferences.  
 
19 In calculating FRQ, I require that a firm has observations for SPINC and ABNACCR, but do not require there to be 
observations for DIS_SMTHC and DDEQ to preserve sample size. If data for either is missing, I take the average of 
the ranks of the remaining variables to calculate FRQ. Results are robust when using different requirements to 
calculate FRQ. 
 
20 Since higher values of DIS_SMTHC, SPINC and ABNACCR represent increasing earnings management, I 
multiply the ranks of these by -1 and average with the rank of DDEQ to calculate the aggregate FRQ measure that 
represents financial reporting quality. 
 
21 For robustness, I also compute an aggregate earnings management measure using principal component analysis; 
results do not change. I report the aggregate measure because doing so preserves the sample size, given the high 
variance in sample size across variables.  
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indicator variable for loss firms (LOSS), the percentage of closely held shares (PCNTCLHLD) 
and cash flows in the fiscal year (CF). More detailed explanations of all of the variables, 
dependent or independent, appear in Appendix A.  
3.3.2 Analyst Forecast Properties 
The next set of dependent variables, analyst forecast properties, are not directly the result 
of a manager’s decisions (like manipulating accruals), but reflect the transparency outcome of 
the firm’s overall information environment. Firms that are more transparent are likely to attract 
more analysts, and the resulting analyst forecasts are likely to be more accurate and less 
dispersed.22  
The first variable I consider is analyst following (ANALYST). Prior literature, such as 
Lang et al. (2003), indicates that analysts are attracted to firms that are more transparent, 
especially in an international context. Further, analyst forecasts for firms that are more 
forthcoming are likely to be more accurate and less dispersed (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Jin 
and Myers, 2006; Maffett, 2012). As such, I also examine two additional analyst forecast 
properties, ACCURACY and DISPERSION, in my analyses. 
Moreover, I aggregate the three analyst forecast properties into a single analyst forecast 
quality variable, AFQ, by taking the average ranks of ANALYST, ACCURACY and 
DISPERSION.23 To control for firm fundamentals that are also related to analyst properties, I 
include the following variables: size (LNTOTASS), return on assets (ROA), return variability 
                                                     
22 In the robustness tests, I also use other transparency proxies to ensure that my results hold even when I use 
different components of transparency for dependent variables. 
 
23 Similar to when I calculated FRQ, I aim to preserve the sample size and do not require that ACCURACY and 
DISPERSION measurements both exist to calculate AFQ. Again, modifying the sample requirements does not 
change the inferences from my results. I also multiply the rank of DISPERSION by -1 so that higher values represent 
greater transparency.  
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(STDRETURN), annual growth in sales (SGROWTH), the earnings surprise when earnings are 
released (EARNSURP) and old firm indicator (OLD).  
 
3.4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for all of the dependent and control variables 
that I use. I provide the mean, lower quartile, median, upper quartile and the standard deviation 
of each variable. Approximately 15% of firms in the sample report small positive income and the 
median firm has a slightly negative level of abnormal accruals, although the mean is slightly 
positive. A single analyst follows the median firm. The average firm has total assets (in U.S. 
dollars) of roughly $242 million, corresponding to a logged value of approximately 5.5, which is 
similar to but slightly less than the median value in Lel and Miller (2015).24 The median firm has 
a book to market ratio below 1, but the mean is at approximately 1.26. The average firm has 
positive growth in sales, slightly less than 50% of the shares closely held, and has positive 
accounting and market performance. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
24 Lel and Miller (2015) discarded all of the firms with less than $10 million in total assets, which would inflate the 
median value. I do not remove such firms in order to conserve sample size; however, my results are essentially 
unchanged when dropping such firms.  
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4.  MAIN RESULTS 
 
4.1 COMPARISON OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT  
Table 3, Panel A reports the results from difference-in-difference estimations with the 
five earnings management proxies as the dependent variables. Higher values of DIS_SMTHC, 
SPINC and ABNACCR represent higher earnings management, while higher values of DDEQ 
and FRQ represent lower earnings management. The independent variable of interest is the 
interaction term, TREAT*POST. In Columns 1, 2 and 4 – in which the dependent variables are 
DIS_SMTHC, SPINC and ABNACCR – the coefficients on TREAT*POST are significantly 
positive, suggesting that earnings management increases in the period following takeover law 
implementation for the treatment firms. The results in Columns 3 and 5 are consistent with the 
results in Columns 1, 2 and 4, as I find a significantly negative coefficient on TREAT*POST for 
DDEQ as well as for the aggregate measure of financial reporting quality, FRQ. Thus, the results 
reported in Table 3, Panel A support the hypothesis that after countries pass takeover laws, the 
managers of firms domiciled there respond by engaging in significantly more earnings 
management activities.  
Panel B presents the results of the same regressions depicted in Panel A, but includes 
firm and year fixed effects rather than country, industry and year effects. Since my observations 
are generally measured at the firm-year level, firm fixed effects help control for unobservable 
firm differences that may serve as omitted correlated variables with earnings management. The 
results of the firm fixed effects specification are quite similar to the results in Panel A. In all five 
regressions, earnings management increases significantly for treatment firms following takeover 
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law adoption. Thus, even when I control for unobservable firm differences between the treatment 
and control firms, I find that firms are significantly more likely to smooth earnings 
discretionarily, report small positive incomes and have poor accruals quality and abnormally 
higher levels of accruals.  
This effect on earnings management appears to be economically meaningful. Focusing on 
Column 5 in Panel B for the aggregate financial reporting quality measure, being in the treatment 
group is associated with a 0.0310 decrease in FRQ. For the median firm, all else being equal, this 
represents a 6% decrease in FRQ, or about 15.5% of an interquartile shift in FRQ. The individual 
earnings management measures are also affected by similar economic magnitudes to the effect 
on FRQ.25 
4.2 COMPARISON OF ANALYST FORECAST PROPERTIES 
Table 4, Columns 1-4 present the results of difference-in-difference regressions with 
ANALYST, ACCURACY, DISPERSION and AFQ as the dependent variables. These estimations 
elucidate how the post-takeover law period affects the transparency of a firm from the 
perspective of analysts, who frequently use the firm’s information. If managers become more 
prone to manipulating accounting numbers, this creates opacity, and the quality of the firm’s 
analyst forecast properties reflect this change. 
Panel A, Columns 1-3 report that the coefficient of TREAT*POST is significantly 
negative, negative and positive for the dependent variables ANALYST, ACCURACY and 
DISPERSION, respectively. This suggests that following takeover law adoption, treatment firms 
have significantly lower analyst following, worse forecast accuracy and greater forecast 
                                                     
25 I provide estimates of economic significance in order to intuitively interpret the magnitude of the effect of being 
in the treatment group on earnings management proxies. The true size of the effect on any given firm is affected by 
numerous factors and circumstances surrounding the firm beyond the scope of this analysis; Hence, this effect is for 
the “median firm, all else equal.” 
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dispersion. Column 4 confirms the previous findings by reporting the coefficient on 
TREAT*POST to be significantly negative for the aggregate analyst forecast quality variable, 
AFQ. The firm fixed effects specification in Panel B not only suggests similar inferences, but 
also presents stronger results than in Panel A. The consistency of the results across the different 
facets of analyst properties and fixed effects specifications provides convincing evidence that 
firms facing higher takeover threats following passage of takeover laws in their countries create 
more opaque information environments.  
Similar to the economic effect on FRQ, being in the treatment group is associated with a 
decrease in the aggregate analyst forecast quality measure by approximately 7% for the median 
firm, or roughly 16% of an interquartile shift in AFQ, all else being equal. Thus, the results are 
economically meaningful and complement the consistent statistical significance of the results 
found in these tests.  
4.3 ROBUSTNESS OF THE MAIN RESULTS 
A key assumption in my difference-in-difference estimation is that without the laws, the 
treatment and control groups would follow similar patterns in the dependent variables. I conduct 
tests to ensure that this assumption holds true for my estimations. Another underlying 
assumption is that the differences in the dependent variables between the two groups are a result 
of the shock and not fundamental differences between the treatment and control firms. Although 
firm fixed effects mitigate this concern, I also use a matched control sample in order to ensure 
that differences in firm fundamentals are not driving my results.  
First, I run the main regressions, controlling for country-specific time trends so as to 
ensure that treatment and control firms follow similar patterns within the time series of the 
dependent variables (Angrist and Pischke, 2015). I interact country and year dummies and 
26 
 
include them as controls in my regressions.26 Table 5, Panel A reports that even with these 
variables included, TREAT*POST remains significantly negative for both FRQ and AFQ. This 
suggests that controlling for country-specific time trends does not change the result, i.e. that 
increases in earnings management and the deterioration of analyst forecast properties follow 
M&A law adoption. 
Second, I bootstrap the statistical significance of the coefficient on TREAT*POST. This 
ensures that the implementation of country-level takeover laws uniquely affects transparency and 
that a random assignment into the treatment group does not indicate the same result. I follow the 
approach in Bushman et al. (2005), who use a set of staggered insider trading laws in their 
setting. First, I randomly assign my sample countries into treatment and control groups.27 For the 
firms chosen to be in the treatment group, I randomly assign an initial year of law 
implementation within my sample period (1992-2009) and define TREAT, POST and 
TREAT*POST accordingly. I estimate my multivariate models from Tables 3 and 4 using the 
random country-event dates and examine the coefficients on TREAT*POST. I repeat this 
simulation of random assignment and estimation 1,000 times in order to yield an empirical 
distribution of TREAT*POST coefficients. Table 5, Panel B presents the results: I find that 
TREAT*POST remains significantly negative for both FRQ and AFQ with the bootstrapped 
statistical significances.  
Finally, I rerun the estimations from Tables 3 and 4 using a matched sample of control 
firms for a better comparison across the treatment and control groups. Each treatment firm is 
                                                     
26 As another robustness check, I include interactions between my control variables and the POST indicator in order 
to control for time trends in control variables. In untabulated regressions, opacity continues to increase significantly 
for treatment firms during the post-M&A law period.  
 
27 For complete randomization, I do not require that assignment into treatment and control nation groups occur in the 
same proportion as the sample countries within the actual data. However, establishing the requirement and re-
running the simulations yield exceedingly similar results.  
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matched with a control firm in the same two-digit ICB industry and fiscal year by size 
(LNTOTASS) and performance (ROA). This serves as a more robust way of controlling for firm 
fundamentals between the treatment and control firms; namely, by restricting the control sample 
to consist of the most similar firms in my treatment sample. Table 5, Panel C presents the results 
of the matched sample tests. I continue to find that treatment firms are significantly more likely 
to manage earnings and have worse analyst forecast properties.  
 Overall, Table 5 presents results of the tests, ensuring the robustness of my main findings 
from Tables 3 and 4 by satisfying assumptions in difference-in-difference estimations. 
Controlling for country-specific time trends, bootstrapping by random assignment and simulation 
and using a matched sample of control firms all indicate the same result: that M&A laws drive 
increased opacity by way of increased earnings management and worsening analyst forecast 
properties.  
4.4 JOB SECURITY CONCERNS 
 With the market for corporate control serving as a governance mechanism by which to 
ensure high performance and thus increasing turnover sensitivity to performance (Lel and Miller, 
2015), regulations aimed at increasing takeover activity in a country pressure managers to 
perform. The resulting pressure and possible desperation to save their jobs may incentivize CEOs 
to manage earnings and become more opaque in way which makes them appear better than what 
the actual performance would indicate. 
 If managers make changes to improve their job security, then earnings management and 
opacity likely increase following takeover legislation more among poorly performing managers. 
These managers face the most pressure to improve their performance or get fired in the face of 
increasing trends of turnover sensitivity to performance. The CEOs who perform highly are less 
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likely to have job security concerns and thus, their incentives to distort accounting numbers seem 
to be less than those of poor performers.  
 I use two measures of performance to divide the sample into strong and poor performance 
firms: a market measure (firm yearly return) and an accounting measure (yearly ROA). I make 
the split based on the sample median of each measure and run the multivariate regressions from 
Tables 3 and 4 to compare the strength of the results in each subsample. Table 6, Panels A and C 
present return split results, while Panels B and D report ROA split results. Panels A and B 
contain earnings management measures as the dependent variables, and C and D use analyst 
forecast properties as the dependent variables.  
 All but one set of regressions across all of the panels in Table 6 report that the coefficient 
of TREAT*POST relates more positively to earnings management and opacity for poor 
performers than for good performers. The one model that suggests otherwise is in Panel A for 
DIS_SMTHC, which reports that high performance firms are more likely to engage in abnormally 
high levels of earnings smoothing. Considering that smoothing includes both upward and 
downward earnings management, this is understandable because good firms may be looking to 
save for the future rather than inflate earnings now (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; DeFond and 
Park, 1997). The chi-squared statistics of the differences in the coefficients are significant at the 
10% level across all of the models presented in Table 6, except for those in the DDEQ models. 
Taken together, the results are consistent with the job security concerns hypothesis, since poorly 
performing CEOs are more desperate to distort accounting information to save their jobs 
following a shock to turnover sensitivity to performance. In contrast, high performance CEOs 
may be more encouraged to smooth earnings to protect themselves in the future, but otherwise 
have no incentives to inflate earnings or hide behind opacity.  
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 Next, I directly address turnover concerns by calculating ex ante turnover probability for 
each firm, based on turnover data collected from Worldscope CD ROMs.28 I follow prior 
literature such as Peters and Wagner (2014) and regress a turnover indicator on a set of variables 
expected to be associated with forced turnover using a logit estimation. These determinants of 
forced turnover include country-industry-adjusted firm yearly ROA, total assets, country-
industry return volatility, a loss indicator, leverage and book-to-market ratio.29 I apply the 
coefficients from this turnover prediction model to each firm in my sample in order to calculate 
the turnover probability, PRED_TURNOVER, for each firm’s manager. I split the sample based 
on the median of this measure and estimate the same multivariate transparency regressions from 
Tables 3 and 4.  
 Table 7, Panels A and B present results consistent with the job security concerns 
hypothesis. Panel A displays evidence of all of the measures of earnings management being 
greater for CEOs with higher ex ante turnover probability. The results in Panel B indicate that 
the adverse impact of takeover laws on analyst forecast properties is also greater for managers 
with higher ex ante turnover pressure. Furthermore, the chi-squared-statistics of differences in 
the coefficients of TREAT*POST between the high and low turnover probability groups are 
significant at the 10% level for all of the dependent variables in Panels A and B, except 
DISPERSION. Thus, Tables 6 and 7 present results that support the hypothesis that the 
unintended consequences of takeover laws on financial reporting are explained by managers with 
greater job security concerns – i.e. poor performers or those with greater turnover risks. As such, 
                                                     
28 The CD-ROMs provide only the name and position of each officer. Thus, it is difficult to distinguish between 
forced and voluntary turnover. I use a forced turnover prediction model using variables known to be correlated with 
forced turnover when calculating turnover probability. I follow DeFond and Hung (2004) in identifying the top 
officer in each firm.  
 
29 Using an alternate turnover prediction model, including country-industry-adjusted returns rather than ROA, yields 
similar results. 
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increases in turnover sensitivity to performance following takeover law adoption encourage 
CEOs facing increased job security concerns to manage earnings and hide behind opacity, for the 
short term or the long term, in order to protect their jobs.  
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5.  ADDITIONAL TESTS 
5.1 INSTITUTIONAL SPLIT 
I explore how the negative effect of takeover laws on the information environment differs 
among countries. Countries with poor quality institutions are likely to have weaker monitoring 
and greater opportunities for managers domiciled in those countries to manipulate accounting 
information (Leuz et al., 2003). To test this, I explore whether increases in earnings management 
and opacity surrounding M&A legislation are more pronounced for countries with poorer 
institutions.  
I employ two measures of institutions. The first variable is the anti-self-dealing index 
(ASDI) from Djankov et al. (2008), which measures the level of difficulty for minority 
shareholders to thwart the consumption of private benefits by controlling shareholders.30 The 
second variable is an indicator that equals one if the country is a common law regime (English 
legal origin) and zero otherwise (COMMON). La Porta et al. (2006) justify the use of legal 
regime by proving that common law countries typically have stronger investor protection.  
Table 8 presents the results for the weak and strong investor protection sample splits 
when investor protection is measured by ASDI (Columns 1-4) and when it is measured by 
COMMON (Columns 5-8). The results suggest that firms in low ASDI and civil law countries 
have more negative coefficients of TREAT*POST when the dependent variable is FRQ or AFQ, 
                                                     
30 Djankov et al. (2008) claim that self-dealing is one of the central problems of corporate governance 
internationally. 
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or FRQ, respectively. The difference between strong and weak institutions is also statistically 
significant for FRQ within the legal origin split at the 1% level. 
Thus, evidence exists that firms domiciled in low ASDI and civil law countries are more 
likely to commit earnings management and have an information environment characterized by 
worse analyst forecast properties. Combined with Lel and Miller’s (2015) finding that turnover 
sensitivity to performance increases at a greater rate for poorer investor protection countries,31 
Table 8 suggests that managers in such countries distort information more in order to prevent 
forced turnover. Thus, the presence of strong institutions or investor protection proves to be an 
important country-level feature that helps deter managers from opportunistically increasing 
earnings management and opacity following takeover law initiation.  
5.2 RAPID INVESTMENTS AND GROWTH 
The literature offers another possible explanation as to why firms’ information 
environment could change following an exogenous shock to takeover threats. Known as the 
“quiet life” hypothesis, it refers to managers going “quiet” by making fewer investments and 
pursuing fewer growth options when insulated from takeover threats. This increases the quality 
of a firm’s financial reports as a result of the decreased uncertainty in cash flows (e.g., Bertrand 
and Mullainathan, 2003; Giroud and Mueller, 2010; Armstrong et al., 2012) associated with 
changes in investing and operating decisions at “quiet life” firms.  
 This paper examines firms’ behavior under increased takeover threats. Thus, the 
literature might predict a reversal of the “quiet life”: lower insulation pressures managers to 
increase investments and focus on rapid growth in order to thwart a potential takeover. 
                                                     
31 Lel and Miller (2015) find that the increased turnover sensitivity to performance following adoption of takeover 
laws is more pronounced for countries with poor institutions, suggesting that high quality institutions already have 
high turnover sensitivity to performance, and thus, takeover law adoption has little effect. They also use the same 
ASDI and COMMON variables to measure institutional quality.  
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Uncertainty and future cash flow variability might then increase, causing financial reports to 
appear to be of lower quality.  
Similar to Giroud and Mueller (2010) and Armstrong et al. (2012), I identify firms with 
positive or negative country- and industry-adjusted growth in (1) assets, (2) PP&E, (3) COGS 
and (4) SG&A, all from Worldscope.32 In this way, managers of firms with negative adjusted 
growth in the four variables are seen as pursuers of the “quiet” life. If the increased opacity is a 
result of managers who are essentially moving away from the “quiet life”, I would expect to see 
the positive relation between TREAT*POST and earnings management or opacity to apply 
moreso for firms with positive country- and industry-adjusted growth in the above four variables. 
Results are presented in Table 9, with the sample split into firms that are likely pursuing 
rapid growth and investments in order to fend off takeovers and firms that are not. I treat firms 
that have negative adjusted growth in all four variables as firms that are not pursuing rapid 
growth. I eliminate firms that have positive or negative growth for fewer than all four of the 
variables in order to ensure that the measure best captures growth strategies.33  
I find no evidence that the positive (negative) relation between TREAT*POST and 
earnings management (analyst forecast properties) is limited to managers of firms with positive 
growth. Thus, this relation has no apparent connection to high growth strategies. The chi-squared 
statistics suggest that the differences in coefficients between the high growth group and the low 
growth group are all insignificant, providing no evidence that the resulting increase in earnings 
                                                     
32 Because I use an international sample, unlike Giroud and Mueller (2010) and Armstrong et al. (2012), I make 
slight modifications such as: adjusting for country and industry, instead of state and industry when measuring 
growth and by using SG&A expense instead of advertising expenses due to data availability in Worldscope.  
 
33 However, I also use different definitions of what makes a firm likely or not likely to pursue rapid growth 
strategies following takeover law adoption. I also look at the growth of each of the four variables on its own. In all 
of the estimations with these different definitions of quiet law reversing firms, my inferences do not change.  
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management and opacity in countries that adopt takeover laws is a result of managers who cease 
to pursue the “quiet life” and instead, attempt to make more investments and pursue growth.  
5.3 SHARE ISSUANCES 
While controversy surrounds what actually happens to firms’ accounting quality with 
regard to equity issuances, prior literature indicates that companies issuing new equity have 
increased incentives to manage earnings so as to help inflate prices (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a, b; 
Ducharme et al., 2004). Thus, I ensure that my results are not isolated to share issuers. I split the 
sample into firms that have a secondary equity offering (SEO) in the following year and firms 
that do not.34 The SEO data is taken from the SDC: Global New Issues database. 
Table 10, Panels A and B present the results for the SEO sample split. There is no clear 
indication that the increased earnings management and deteriorating analyst forecast properties 
in the post-law period for treatment firms is isolated to SEO firms. The differences in the 
coefficients of TREAT*POST between SEO and non-SEO firms are insignificant. To the extent 
that there are differences, the non-issuers have more pronounced coefficients than do the issuers. 
Therefore, I can also rule out share issuances as the driver behind increased earnings 
management and opacity following takeover law adoption. 
5.4 ADDITIONAL CONTROLS FOR CONFOUNDING CHANNELS 
 There are other sets of concurrent regulations that could have affected earnings 
management or transparency during the sample period. Thus, I include a set of controls to rule 
out confounding channels and ensure that the takeover laws are responsible for affecting the 
post-law information environment. I include corporate governance reforms (Kim and Lu, 2013), 
short selling regulations (Maffett et al., 2015) and insider trading laws (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 
                                                     
34 I also split the sample into firms that have a SEO in the concurrent year and find no difference in the inferences.  
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2002).35 I also control for country-level investor protection to ensure that the results are 
incremental to institutions’ effects on financial reporting. I create a dummy variable, 
GOODINVPROT, to represent firms in countries with high quality institutions. This dummy 
variable equals one if ASDI is higher than the sample median and the firm is from a common law 
regime, and zero otherwise.  
Results are presented in Table 11 with the earnings management variables in Panel A and 
analyst forecast variables in Panel B. In both panels, I continue to find consistent evidence that 
opacity significantly increases for treatment firms following takeover law adoption. Furthermore, 
it is interesting to note that corporate governance reforms (CGR) tend to be negatively correlated 
with information quality despite the reforms’ intentions to improve governance mechanisms. 
Moreover, as expected, GOODINVPROT tends to be positively correlated with transparency. 
Nevertheless, takeover law adoption continues to be associated with increasing earnings 
management and opacity incremental to all of the other concurrent effects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
35 I also include a measure of the legal protection of labor unions and regulation of collective disputes from labor 
laws (Atanassov and Kim, 2009). However, the regressions do not report a coefficient for the labor laws variable 
because of multicollinearity. Thus, I do not report this variable in the tables. The insider trading laws variable is also 
omitted because of the multicollinearity in all but a few earnings management models. Thus, this variable is not 
reported in Panel B. I can be confident, however, that country fixed effects in my model take care of any variation 
that these other effects might create.  
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6.  ROBUSTNESS ANALYSES 
6.1 OTHER TRANSPARENCY PROXIES 
 As previously mentioned, transparency is an unobservable measure and can take many 
forms. While this paper has primarily focused on earnings management and analyst forecasts, the 
extant literature uses other facets of transparency as logical proxies. Thus, I make sure that other 
measures of transparency follow the same pattern as with earnings management and analyst 
forecast properties.  
One measure I examine is whether the firm employs a Big 5 auditor to audit its financial 
statements (BIG5), which is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm had a Big 5 auditor in a 
given firm-year and zero otherwise.36 A number of sources provide auditor data, including point-
in-time Worldscope CDs, Compustat Global and Osiris. Prior literature, such as Teoh and Wong 
(1993), presents evidence that oversight by a Big 5 auditor is associated with a higher quality of 
financial reporting. Control variables are chosen from those which prior literature has shown to 
be correlated with the decision to employ a certain type of auditor (e.g., Fan and Wong, 2005). 
These variables include firm size (LNTOTASS), book to market ratio (BM), leverage (LEV), 
return on assets (ROA), total inventory scaled by total assets (INVTA), accounts receivables 
scaled by total assets (ARTA), an indicator variable for an old firm (OLD) and cash flows (CF).  
The other transparency proxies I also examine are based on users of accounting 
information. Investors, as well as analysts, use firms’ financial reports to make important 
                                                     
36 The Big 5 auditors are Price WaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and Arthur 
Andersen. Names may have varied in different years, but I treat all of them as the same audit firm.  
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decisions. Investors’ behavior, especially in their reactions to the release of financial information 
such as earnings announcements, may reflect firms’ transparency. Thus, I use two proxies for the 
information content of earnings announcements, following DeFond et al. (2007) and Landsman 
et al. (2012).  
The first proxy, AVOL, represents abnormal trading volume, or the natural log of the 
mean of the event period (day t-10 to t+10 if t is the day of the earnings announcement) volume 
divided by the average estimation period (day t-60 to t-10 and day t+10 to t+60) volume. The 
second proxy, AVAR, is the natural log of the ratio of the mean of the squared market model 
adjusted returns in the event period divided by the variance of the firm’s market model residuals 
during the estimation period. The relevant literature finds that the information content of 
earnings announcements is higher in settings in which investors find the information to be more 
reliable (e.g., DeFond et al., 2007; Landsman et al., 2012). In other words, transparent earnings 
have more information content and higher investor reactions reflect this in the form of greater 
abnormal volume (more trading to transparent information) and abnormal volatility (more 
dissimilar interpretations of transparent earnings announcements). Control variables for these 
two models include size (LNTOTASS), annual sales growth (SGROWTH), return on assets 
(ROA), return variability (STDRETURN), book to market ratio (BM), loss indicator (LOSS), the 
number of days between fiscal year end and earnings announcement (EADELAY), leverage 
(LEV) and the percent of closely held shares (PCNTCLHLD). 
 Table 12 presents the results. In all three of the models, TREAT*POST is significantly 
negative. This means that following takeover law implementation, firms become much less likely 
to employ a high quality auditor and the information content of their earnings announcements 
significantly decrease, suggesting increasing opacity of the firm’s financial information. Results 
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are robust when using firm fixed effects specifications. Thus, even when using other proxies for 
transparency, I find that opacity increases following M&A law adoption.  
6.2 REDUCED SAMPLE PERIOD  
To mitigate the influence of omitted determinants of earnings management and opacity 
many years prior to or following the passage of takeover laws unrelated to takeover threats, I 
condense the sample period to include only a fixed number of years prior to, and following, the 
adoption year. Table 13, Columns 1 and 2 present the results from a sample period that is 
restricted to three years before and after takeover law adoption.37 
Both models (for FRQ and AFQ) display results consistent with those that appear in 
Tables 3 and 4. The results imply that earnings management and opacity increase for treatment 
firms following takeover law adoption, regardless of how many years pre- and post-law that the 
sample includes.  
6.3 PRE-2004 SAMPLE 
 The implementation dates of the takeover laws in my sample are between 1995 and 2004. 
However, Switzerland passed M&A legislation in 2004, and thus, the sample includes 
observations through 2009. However, three international events warrant a robustness check using 
a sample that stops prior to 2004. These are the 2004 EU takeover directive, the adoption of the 
2005 mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by many countries and the 
2008 financial crisis, all of which could have affected earnings management and analyst 
forecasts. In order to end the sample period prior to 2004, I remove Switzerland observations 
from the sample. 
                                                     
37 I run the same tests using a sample that includes up to five years before and after takeover law adoption, and 
inferences remain the same. 
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 Results of the tests which use a sample that ends prior to 2004 are presented in Table 13, 
Columns 3 and 4. These results indicate that the coefficients of TREAT*POST remain with the 
predicted signs. These coefficients are significant for aggregate information quality measures as 
well as the dependent variables. Thus, when I terminate the sample period prior to 2004 in order 
to avoid effects of the EU takeover directive, IFRS adoption and the financial crisis, I continue to 
find significant evidence that opacity and earnings management increases more for treatment 
firms following takeover law adoption.  
6.4 DROPPING THE TREATMENT YEAR AND THE YEAR BEFORE THE TREATMENT 
YEAR 
 I observe occurrences after removing two years from the sample. I remove the adoption 
year for each country, because the date of enactment and its impact on the given fiscal year is 
unclear. A number of observations may have experienced more months under the new takeover 
law regime than others, yet they are all coded the same. Furthermore, I remove the year prior to 
M&A law implementation because firms may manage earnings and become more opaque in 
anticipation of these laws being passed, although this would bias the results against my findings.  
 The results in Table 13, Columns 5 and 6 provide evidence that even with observations in 
the year of and the year before M&A law enactment dropped from the sample, the coefficients 
on TREAT*POST remain significantly negative. As such, I have confidence that my results are 
not affected by different law adoption dates during the fiscal year or by the anticipation of the 
passage of these laws. Rather, it is the laws themselves that drive the subsequent differences in 
changes to earnings management and opacity between the treatment and control groups. 
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 6.5 DROPPING COUNTRIES ONE BY ONE 
 In order to maximize the generalizability of my results for countries not included within 
the sample, I also test whether a single country drives my results. I rerun the main tests on a 
sample that includes every treatment country but one, dropping each in turn. No matter which 
country I drop, I find the same results as when I include all of the countries (untabulated).38 This 
suggests that my results are not attributable to any one particular country and rather, can be 
generalized to other settings for which a takeover law may be adopted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
38 Inferences remain unchanged when I drop the following countries from the sample: Japan (which comprises 36% 
of my observations) South Korea, Indonesia or Thailand, who were hit the hardest by the Asian financial crisis in the 
late 1990s.  
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7.  CONCLUSION 
Corporate governance is critical in ensuring the alignment of shareholders’ and 
managers’ interests and mitigating agency problems. The literature regards turnover sensitivity to 
performance as an important mechanism for strong governance. However, this can 
simultaneously increase job security concerns for CEOs. These concerns create incentives to 
manage earnings and hide behind opaque financial reporting in order to distort the accounting 
information upon which CEOs are evaluated so as to save their jobs. On the other hand, 
regulations that enhance governance mechanisms could curtail earnings management and 
promote transparent financial reporting. In this paper, I attempt to address this tension by 
exploiting a global exogenous shock to the market for corporate control, an important 
governance mechanism associated with increased turnover sensitivity to performance. Using 
measures of earnings management and analyst forecast properties, I investigate whether takeover 
legislation improves or deteriorates information quality.  
I find that following M&A law initiation, earnings management increases and analyst 
forecast properties worsen for firms domiciled in countries that pass takeover legislation. More 
specifically, discretionary smoothing, target beating and abnormal accruals increase, while 
accruals quality decreases for firms located in M&A law countries during the post-legislation 
period. Furthermore, analyst following decreases, analyst forecast accuracy worsens and analyst 
forecast dispersion increases for these same firms. As such, I use an international setting to 
provide evidence that takeover threats are associated with poorer information quality, a 
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relationship upon which prior literature has not come to a clear consensus with regard to the US 
setting.  
I also provide strong evidence that the increase in earnings management and opacity is 
greater for firms that have worse market and accounting performance and higher turnover risk. 
This suggests that the relation is primarily attributable to managers who have greater job security 
concerns. Managers with poor performance or higher turnover probability are under greater 
pressure to improve performance or get fired, especially in a setting in which turnover sensitivity 
to performance improves. I also find evidence that managers with good performance may be 
more prone to discretionarily smooth earnings in order to mitigate turnover risk in future years. 
Overall, my results are consistent with job security concerns incentivizing CEOs to manage 
earnings and create an opaque information environment in an attempt to save their jobs, whether 
in the short term or in the long term.  
Furthermore, when I split the sample based on country-level institutions, I find that one 
way to combat these unintended consequences is by having high investor protection at the 
country level, as my results are more pronounced for firms in countries with poor institutions. 
This suggests that strong country-level institutions can limit managers’ opportunities to 
manipulate accounting information in order to save their jobs.  
In addition, I find no support for other theories with regard to why the information 
environment deteriorates following takeover legislation, such as: pursuance of investments and 
rapid growth in response to decreased insulation from takeover threats or a need to access equity 
markets by issuing shares. This indicates that turnover threats that increase following M&A 
legislation, rather than takeover threats alone, explain these results. I also find that the effect of 
takeover laws on the information environment is incremental to the effects of other concurrent 
43 
 
mechanisms, such as short-selling legislation. Thus, takeover legislation that enhances one area 
of governance through increased performance monitoring has unintended consequences as a 
result of managers’ fears for their jobs. This results in higher earnings management and 
worsened analyst forecast properties. My inferences remain unchanged even after conducting a 
number of robustness tests.  
In this paper, I document an unintended, but negative, consequence of legislation that 
increases the discipline of managers. Managers who are more likely to lose their jobs as a result 
of this disciplinary mechanism respond by creating a more opaque information environment in 
order to retain their jobs. My findings suggest that future research further examine the relation 
between governance and earnings management. More research can be done to study other 
specific governance mechanisms and how firms or countries can encourage managers to perform 
well for their shareholders, as well as how this can be achieved without unintendedly 
encouraging managers with job security concerns to implement earnings management and hide 
behind opacity that can potentially damage the firms’ and their own long-term well-being.  
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Appendix A.  Description of Variables 
 
DIS_SMTHC Discretionary earnings smoothing, a combination of two measures of earnings 
management – the variability of net income relative to cash flows and the 
correlation between accruals and cash flows. These two measures are regressed on 
a set of earnings smoothing determinants (total assets, leverage, book-to-market, 
sales volatility, loss frequency, operating cycle length, sales growth, operating 
leverage, average cash flows from operations, year fixed effects, and industry 
fixed effects). Then, the average of the scaled percentile rank of the resulting 
residuals is used. Calculation is based on Lang et al. (2012) 
SPINC Indicator variable that equals one if there was a small positive income in the fiscal 
year and zero otherwise. Small positive income is defined as net income scaled by 
total assets being between 0 and 0.01 
DDEQ Standard deviation of the residuals from a rolling five-year model that regresses 
accruals on current, past, and future cash flows. Calculation is based on Dechow 
and Dichev (2002)  
ABNACCR Signed measure of abnormal accruals, which is defined as the difference between 
a firm’s accruals for a given year and the firm’s predicted accruals. A firm’s 
predicted accruals is the result of calculating the following: [Sales*(Lagged 
Current Accruals /Lagged Sales) – (Gross PPE*(Lagged Depreciation/Lagged 
Gross PPE))]/Lagged Total Assets. Calculation is based on DeFond and Park 
(2001) and Francis and Wang (2008) 
FRQ Financial reporting quality, or an aggregate measure of the four earnings 
management measures. Calculated as the average of the ranks of each of 
DIS_SMTHC, SPINC, DDEQ, and ABNACCR 
ANALYST The number of analysts making an earnings forecast for the fiscal year, from 
I/B/E/S 
ACCURACY The absolute value of the forecast error scaled by the stock price at the end of the 
prior fiscal year multiplied by -1; forecast error is the analysts’ mean annual 
earnings forecast less actual earnings, from I/B/E/S 
DISPERSION The standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts of firm’s earnings, scaled by the 
mean forecast and then divided by the square root of the number of analysts 
following that firm, also from I/B/E/S 
AFQ Analyst Forecast Quality, calculated as the average ranks of the ANALYST, 
ACCURACY, and DISPERSION measures 
TREAT*POST An indicator that equals 1 if the firm is in a country that passes a takeover law at 
some point during the sample period and the time period is after the law is 
initiated, and 0 otherwise. 
LNTOTASS The log of TAUSD, total assets of a firm in US dollars 
BM Book-to-market ratio, calculated by dividing book value of common equity by 
market value of equity at fiscal year-end 
ROA Net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at fiscal year-end 
STDRETURN Return volatility, or the annual standard deviation from monthly stock returns 
OLD Indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm’s age is above the sample median age, 
and 0 otherwise. Firm age is taken from Worldscope as number of years since the 
initial date the firm existed in Worldscope at the time in question 
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SGROWTH The percentage change in total sales from fiscal year t-1 to year t 
LOSS Indicator equal to one if the firm’s net income before extraordinary items is 
negative, and zero otherwise 
PCNTCLHLD Average proportion of shares that are closely held at year-end 
CF Cash flows in a fiscal year, taken from Worldscope 
EARNSURP Earnings surprise, calculated as the absolute value of the forecast error scaled by 
the stock price at the end of the prior fiscal year multiplied by -1. Forecast error is 
the analysts’ mean annual earnings forecast less actual earnings, from I/B/E/S 
RETURN Yearly firm return, taken from Datastream 
PRED_TURNOVER The ex ante probability of forced turnover calculated using a regression of an 
actual turnover indicator on a set of determinants including country-industry 
adjusted returns, total assets, country-industry return volatility, a loss indicator, 
leverage, and book-to-market ratio. Actual turnover data is collected from 
Worldscope CD-ROMs. 
QLR If a firm is classified as being likely to reverse the “quiet life,” each of the 
country-industry adjusted measures of growth from year t-1 to t in total assets, net 
PP&E, cost of goods sold, and SG&A expense must all be positive. A firm is 
classified as not being likely to reverse the “quiet life” if none of the four growth 
measures are positive 
SEO  Taken from SDC: Platinum Global New Issues, a firm is a SEO firm if it had a 
SEO in the fiscal year 
ASDI Anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008) 
COMMON A common law indicator taken from La Porta et al. (2006) 
CGR An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is in a country that passes legislation 
aimed at corporate governance reform, and it is during the post-law period. CGRs 
are from Kim and Lu (2013) 
SHORTLEGAL An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is in a country that passes legislation 
making short selling legal, and it is during the post-law period. Short selling laws 
are from Maffett et al. (2015) 
ITLAW An indicator variable that equals one if insider-trading laws are enforced in the 
country of origin and it is during the post-law period. These laws come from 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) 
GOODINVPROT An indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s ASDI is higher than the yearly 
sample median ASDI and if the firm is from a common law country 
(COMMON=1). 
BIG5 Indicator variables equal to one if the firm is audited by a “Big 5” auditing firm 
during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise (collected from historical point-in-time 
Datastream, Compustat Global, and Osiris) 
AVOL The abnormal trading volume, calculated as ln(mean(Vit) /Vi), where mean(Vit) is 
the average event-period volume for firm i and Vi is the mean estimation-period 
volume for that firm. The event period covers days -1, 0, +1, and the non-event 
period covers days t-60 to t-10 and t+10 to t+60 relative to the I/B/E/S earnings 
announcement date, t=0. This calculation follows that of Landsman et al. (2012) 
AVAR The abnormal return variance, calculated as ln(u2it/σ2i), where u2it = Rit – (αi + 
βiRmt), Rit is the firm’s stock return, Rmt is the equal-weighted return for all within-
country firms in the sample, and αi and βi are firm i’s event-period market model 
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parameter estimates. σ2i is the variance of the market-model residuals in the non-
event period. The event period covers days -1, 0, +1, and the non-event period 
covers days t-60 to t-10 and t+10 to t+60 relative to the I/B/E/S earnings 
announcement date, t=0. This is also based on Landsman et al. (2012) 
LEV Total liabilities divided by total assets at fiscal year-end 
INVTA The ratio of total inventory in a firm to its total assets in a given fiscal year 
ARTA The ratio of accounts receivable to total assets in a given fiscal year 
EADELAY The amount of delay in releasing a firm’s own earnings announcements, 
calculated as the number of days that lapse between fiscal year-end and the 
earnings announcement 
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TABLE 1.  LIST OF COUNTRIES AND TAKEOVER LAWS 
   
COUNTRY 
TAKEOVER 
LAW YEAR LAW 
ARGENTINA   
AUSTRIA 1998 Takeover Act 
BRAZIL   
CHILE 2000 Tender Offer Act 
CHINA   
COLOMBIA    
DENMARK   
FRANCE   
GERMANY 2002 Takeover Act 
GREECE   
HUNGARY   
INDIA 1997 
Substantial Acquisition of Shares and 
Takeovers 
INDONESIA 1998 M&A Regulations 
IRELAND  1997 Takeover Panel Act 
JAPAN   
KOREA   
LUXEMBOURG   
MALAYSIA 1998 Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
MEXICO   
NEW ZEALAND 2001 Takeovers Code 
NORWAY   
PAKISTAN 2000 
Ordinance on Substantial Acquisitions of 
Shares and Takeovers of Listed Companies 
PERU   
PHILIPPINES 1998 Tender Offer Rules 
POLAND   
PORTUGAL   
SRI LANKA 1995 Company Takeovers and Mergers Code 
SWITZERLAND 2004 The Merger Act 
TAIWAN 2002 Business Mergers and Acquisitions Act 
THAILAND   
TURKEY   
VENEZUELA   
ZIMBABWE   
 
Table 1 presents a list of countries in my sample, the year in which takeover laws were initiated, and the name of the 
takeover law.  
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TABLE 2.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable Mean 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl Std Dev 
DIS_SMTHC 0.5232 0.3000 0.5550 0.7400 0.2655 
SPINC 0.1529 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3599 
DDEQ -0.0382 -0.0469 -0.0256 -0.0140 0.0402 
ABNACCR 0.0028 -0.0490 -0.0001 0.0485 0.1292 
FRQ 0.5118 0.4150 0.5200 0.6150 0.1394 
ANALYST 2.6753 0.0000 1.0000 3.0000 4.8240 
ACCURACY -0.0673 -0.0418 -0.0112 -0.0033 0.1821 
DISPERSION 0.0849 0.0139 0.0357 0.0884 0.1435 
AFQ 0.5793 0.4500 0.5850 0.7067 0.1623 
LNTOTASS 5.6625 4.4489 5.4907 6.7194 1.8319 
BM 1.2609 0.4359 0.8005 1.4526 1.9961 
ROA 0.0128 0.0025 0.0217 0.0530 0.1168 
STDRETURN 0.1267 0.0739 0.1064 0.1561 0.0783 
OLD  0.7339 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4419 
SGROWTH 0.0976 -0.0414 0.0485 0.1731 0.2933 
LOSS 0.2120 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4087 
PCNTCLHLD 0.4855 0.3176 0.4860 0.6510 0.2240 
CF 0.0516 0.0105 0.0532 0.0995 0.0888 
EARNSURP 0.1695 0.0116 0.0354 0.1204 0.3859 
PRED_TURNOVER -1.7666 -1.8457 -1.7945 -1.6991 0.1225 
RETURN 0.1485 -0.2490 0.0000 0.3333 0.6790 
QLR 0.7709 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4202 
SEO 0.0279 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1647 
ASDI 0.5030 0.4260 0.4830 0.4861 0.1771 
COMMON 0.0961 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2947 
BIG5 0.3880 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4873 
AVOL -0.0805 -0.5602 -0.0574 0.4264 0.8509 
AVAR -0.6527 -1.5993 -0.3769 0.6234 1.9500 
LEV 0.5739 0.3843 0.5596 0.7264 0.3955 
INVTA 0.1286 0.0393 0.1048 0.1837 0.1163 
ARTA 0.2064 0.0917 0.1836 0.2900 0.1475 
EADELAY 77.1777 51.0000 69.0000 91.0000 37.9700 
 
Note: Variable definitions and detailed measurements are provided in Appendix A. 
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TABLE 3.  TAKEOVER LAWS AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
Panel A – Country and Industry Fixed Effects   
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 DIS_SMTHC SPINC DDEQ ABNACCR FRQ 
Prediction (+) (+) (-) (+) (-) 
TREAT*POST 0.0281*** 0.0519*** -0.00433*** 0.0133*** -0.0286*** 
 (3.06) (6.83) (-3.36) (4.83) (-7.74) 
LNTOTASS 0.000681 0.0132*** 0.00311*** -0.000130 0.00212*** 
 (0.41) (9.14) (15.56) (-0.43) (3.60) 
BM -0.00755*** 0.0103*** 0.000704*** -0.000318 0.00149*** 
 (-7.59) (8.35) (4.26) (-0.91) (3.43) 
ROA 0.115*** -0.800*** 0.0654*** 0.360*** -0.166*** 
 (4.20) (-19.16) (11.83) (25.25) (-13.19) 
STDRETURN -0.208*** 0.171*** -0.0667*** 0.0474*** -0.0853*** 
 (-7.55) (6.94) (-15.23) (4.66) (-7.61) 
OLD 0.00589 0.0308*** 0.00888*** 0.000412 0.00214 
 (0.85) (6.33) (9.28) (0.30) (0.90) 
SGROWTH 0.0191*** -0.0616*** -0.00620*** 0.0223*** -0.0149*** 
 (2.94) (-10.99) (-5.12) (5.45) (-4.71) 
LOSS 0.0165*** -0.309*** -0.00494*** -0.00707*** 0.0262*** 
 (3.02) (-50.43) (-7.31) (-3.87) (11.73) 
PCNTCLHLD 0.0549*** -0.0120 0.00514*** 0.00432* -0.0183*** 
 (4.95) (-1.30) (3.64) (1.73) (-4.50) 
CF -0.194*** -0.357*** 0.00552 -0.550*** 0.501*** 
 (-7.84) (-15.51) (1.30) (-43.19) (44.29) 
Constant 0.335*** 0.110* -0.0535*** 0.0230* 0.509*** 
 (8.05) (1.91) (-10.15) (1.81) (18.64) 
      
Observations 41165 52692 29327 44106 44105 
Adj R-squared 0.044 0.204 0.328 0.130 0.119 
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Panel B – Firm Fixed Effects  
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 DIS_SMTHC SPINC DDEQ ABNACCR FRQ 
Prediction (+) (+) (-) (+) (-) 
TREAT*POST 0.0357*** 0.0551*** -0.00242* 0.0126*** -0.0310*** 
 (3.50) (6.40) (-1.88) (3.66) (-7.19) 
LNTOTASS 0.0121* 0.0530*** 0.00461*** -0.0193*** 0.00349 
 (1.75) (9.86) (3.87) (-8.53) (1.20) 
BM -0.00802*** 0.0103*** 0.000484* 0.000659 0.000626 
 (-6.24) (6.65) (1.85) (0.95) (0.95) 
ROA 0.183*** -0.836*** 0.0419*** 0.419*** -0.197*** 
 (6.43) (-18.60) (6.76) (19.90) (-12.61) 
STDRETURN -0.105*** 0.0376 -0.0245*** 0.0496*** -0.0288** 
 (-3.95) (1.33) (-5.91) (3.58) (-2.13) 
SGROWTH 0.0105* -0.0544*** -0.00265** 0.0329*** -0.0148*** 
 (1.72) (-8.80) (-2.35) (6.82) (-4.08) 
LOSS 0.0175*** -0.381*** -0.00116* -0.0113*** 0.0493*** 
 (3.40) (-52.36) (-1.74) (-4.69) (19.63) 
PCNTCLHLD 0.0749*** 0.0238 -0.000824 0.00653 -0.0246*** 
 (4.78) (1.63) (-0.32) (1.07) (-3.52) 
CF 0.0184 -0.224*** -0.00141 -0.785*** 0.589*** 
 (0.79) (-9.14) (-0.35) (-44.68) (41.76) 
Constant 0.375*** -0.102* -0.0629*** 0.123*** 0.462*** 
 (7.83) (-1.68) (-7.71) (6.67) (15.24) 
      
Observations 41165 52692 29327 44106 44105 
Adj R-squared 0.418 0.337 0.650 0.137 0.262 
 
Table 3 presents results to difference-in-differences estimations of the effect of takeover laws on earnings management. The estimation in Panel 
A contains country, industry, and year fixed effects, and the estimation in Panel B contains firm and year fixed effects. In both panels, the 
dependent variables are presented in each of the columns and represent different aspects of earnings management: discretionary smoothing 
(DIS_SMTHC), small positive income (SPINC), the Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure of accruals quality (DDEQ), abnormal accruals 
(ABNACCR), and an aggregate measure of earnings management that is the ranked average of the prior four measures (FRQ). The main 
explanatory variable is the interaction TREAT*POST, which equals 1 if the firm is located in a country that implemented a takeover law during 
the sample period, and if the observation was from after initiation of such law. t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on robust standard 
errors at the firm level. All continuous unranked nonlogarithmic variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Asterisks ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All detailed variable definitions and calculations are in Appendix A. 
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TABLE 4.  TAKEOVER LAWS AND ANALYST FORECAST PROPERTIES 
Panel A – Country and Industry Fixed Effects  
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ANALYST ACCURACY DISPERSION AFQ 
Prediction (-) (-) (+) (-) 
TREAT*POST -1.243*** -0.0196*** 0.0177*** -0.0240*** 
 (-8.08) (-4.70) (4.67) (-6.47) 
LNTOTASS 2.115*** 0.00818*** -0.0104*** 0.0324*** 
 (46.02) (15.00) (-16.21) (42.35) 
ROA 9.083*** 0.315*** -0.136*** 0.229*** 
 (15.31) (15.65) (-7.63) (13.05) 
STDRETURN 3.419*** 0.00918 0.0699*** 0.00616 
 (7.84) (0.57) (3.91) (0.47) 
SGROWTH 0.593*** 0.00547 -0.0237*** 0.0176*** 
 (6.17) (1.45) (-6.47) (5.67) 
EARNSURP -0.281*** -0.239*** 0.0101*** -0.0843*** 
 (-3.37) (-42.42) (3.76) (-36.15) 
OLD -0.554*** -0.0105*** 0.00938*** -0.0246*** 
 (-4.25) (-5.08) (3.76) (-7.96) 
Constant -5.435*** -0.111*** 0.136*** 0.414*** 
 (-9.54) (-7.98) (10.70) (30.47) 
     
Observations 49514 49514 34736 49514 
Adj R-squared 0.424 0.340 0.065 0.247 
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Panel B - Firm Fixed Effects 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ANALYST ACCURACY DISPERSION AFQ 
Prediction (-) (-) (+) (-) 
TREAT*POST -1.585*** -0.0268*** 0.0251*** -0.0410*** 
 (-9.92) (-5.21) (5.61) (-9.46) 
LNTOTASS 1.121*** 0.0287*** 0.00341 0.0446*** 
 (9.91) (7.57) (1.13) (14.98) 
ROA 5.387*** 0.468*** -0.0879*** 0.202*** 
 (12.46) (15.09) (-3.86) (11.54) 
STDRETURN 1.507*** -0.0250 0.0320 0.00720 
 (4.36) (-1.18) (1.44) (0.51) 
SGROWTH 0.169** -0.00526 -0.0167*** 0.00508 
 (2.08) (-1.06) (-3.68) (1.54) 
EARNSURP -0.502*** -0.194*** 0.0113*** -0.0563*** 
 (-6.94) (-27.06) (3.24) (-20.87) 
Constant -1.379* -0.212*** 0.0520** 0.338*** 
 (-1.92) (-8.22) (2.51) (17.14) 
     
Observations 49514 49514 34736 49514 
Adj R-squared 0.775 0.428 0.209 0.437 
 
Table 4 presents results to difference-in-differences estimations of the effect of takeover laws on analyst forecast properties. The estimation in 
Panel A contains country, industry, and year fixed effects, and the estimation in Panel B contains firm and year fixed effects. In both panels, the 
dependent variables are presented in each of the columns and represent different analyst forecast properties: the level of analyst following 
(ANALYST), analyst forecast accuracy (ACCURACY), analyst forecast dispersion (DISPERSION), and an aggregate measure of analyst forecast 
quality that is the ranked average of the prior three measures (AFQ). The main explanatory variable is the interaction TREAT*POST, which 
equals 1 if the firm is located in a country that implemented a takeover law during the sample period, and if the observation was from after 
initiation of such law. t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors at the firm level. All continuous unranked 
nonlogarithmic variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. All detailed variable definitions and calculations are in Appendix A. 
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TABLE 5.  ROBUSTNESS OF MAIN RESULTS 
Panel A - Takeover Laws and Transparency 
          with Country Time Trends Controls 
   
 (1) (2) 
 FRQ AFQ 
Prediction (-) (-) 
TREAT*POST -0.0975*** -0.292*** 
 (-5.90) (-2.78) 
 
 
Panel B - Bootstrapping Randomized Estimations 
   
1000 Randomizations   
 (1) (2) 
 FRQ AFQ 
Prediction (-) (-) 
TREAT*POST -0.0286*** -0.0240*** 
p-values from Tables 3 and 4 (0.000) (0.000) 
Bootstrapped p-values (0.011) (0.068) 
 
 
 
Panel C - Takeover Laws and Transparency 
          with Matched Sample 
   
 (1) (2) 
 FRQ AFQ 
Prediction (-) (-) 
TREAT*POST -0.0192*** -0.0251*** 
 (-4.40) (-5.69) 
 
Table 5 presents result to difference-in-differences estimations of the effect of takeover laws on transparency. In all three panels, the dependent 
variables are presented in each of the columns and represent two components of transparency: financial reporting quality (FRQ) and analyst 
forecast quality (AFQ). The main explanatory variable is the interaction TREAT*POST, which equals 1 if the firm is located in a country that 
implemented a takeover law during the sample period, and if the observation was from after initiation of such law. Control variables are the same 
as those used in Tables 3 and 4, but are not reported for parsimony. Panel A presents the results for the estimation that includes country-year 
interaction terms to control for country-specific time trends. Panel B presents bootstrapped p-values based on 1,000 estimations with randomized 
treatment and control samples, as well as the year of M&A law adoption. Those p-values are presented below p-values from the estimations from 
Tables 3 and 4. Panel C presents the results for estimations using a control sample matched with the treatment sample based on size (total assets) 
and profitability (ROA). t-statistics in Panels A and C are in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors at the firm level. All three panel 
estimations contain country, industry, and year fixed effects. All continuous unranked nonlogarithmic variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All detailed variable definitions and 
calculations are in Appendix A.
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Table 6.  Takeover Laws and Opacity – Performance Splits 
Panel A - Takeover Laws and Earnings Management – Return Splits      
 (1) (2) (3)                (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 DIS_SMTH DIS_SMTH SPINC SPINC DDEQ DDEQ ABNACCR ABNACCR FRQ FRQ 
RETURN Poor Good Poor Good Poor Good Poor Good Poor Good 
TREAT*POST 0.00728 0.0400*** 0.086*** 0.0285*** -0.006*** -0.00299** 0.0195*** 0.00681** -0.0356*** -0.0205*** 
  (0.48) (3.35) (6.44) (3.03) (-2.60) (-2.12) (3.99) (2.14) (-5.78) (-4.26) 
LNTOTASS 0.00458 -0.00243 0.020*** 0.0137*** 0.0028*** 0.00273*** -0.000259 -0.000184 0.000104 0.0031*** 
 (1.53) (-1.09) (7.53) (6.67) (8.04) (9.89) (-0.49) (-0.44) (0.09) (3.71) 
BM -0.0068*** -0.0085*** 0.011*** 0.0065*** 0.0008*** 0.000962*** -0.000873 0.000234 0.00180*** 0.0021*** 
 (-4.67) (-5.30) (5.92) (3.77) (3.39) (4.04) (-1.60) (0.42) (2.81) (2.89) 
ROA 0.199*** 0.0397 -0.91*** -0.899*** 0.0735*** 0.0437*** 0.331*** 0.379*** -0.131*** -0.163*** 
 (4.81) (0.83) (-11.76) (-12.43) (9.24) (5.34) (14.04) (15.96) (-6.41) (-7.86) 
STDRETURN -0.155*** -0.190*** 0.207*** 0.207*** -0.07*** -0.0607*** 0.0500*** 0.0356** -0.103*** -0.0818*** 
 (-3.72) (-4.47) (5.25) (5.25) (-10.81) (-9.78) (3.31) (2.07) (-6.06) (-4.39) 
OLD -0.0191 0.0116 0.0332** 0.0135 0.0115*** 0.00504*** 0.000623 0.00238 0.000751 -0.00113 
 (-0.98) (0.86) (2.19) (1.45) (3.88) (2.91) (0.13) (1.00) (0.10) (-0.24) 
SGROWTH 0.0169 0.0231** -0.07*** -0.0471*** -0.0054** -0.00574*** 0.0262*** 0.0236*** -0.0139** -0.0198*** 
 (1.58) (2.45) (-6.97) (-5.57) (-2.53) (-3.51) (3.59) (4.01) (-2.55) (-4.30) 
LOSS 0.0382*** -0.0102 -0.38*** -0.285*** -0.00144* -0.00820*** -0.00853*** -0.00549* 0.0337*** 0.0257*** 
 (5.07) (-1.12) (-37.95) (-29.46) (-1.66) (-7.83) (-3.33) (-1.75) (10.49) (6.99) 
PCNTCLHLD 0.0646*** 0.0675*** -0.0192 0.00994 0.000119 0.00608*** 0.00607 0.00854** -0.0283*** -0.0198*** 
 (3.49) (4.36) (-1.15) (0.80) (0.05) (3.26) (1.50) (2.48) (-4.14) (-3.45) 
CF -0.157*** -0.209*** -0.48*** -0.336*** 0.00991 0.00676 -0.585*** -0.548*** 0.552*** 0.507*** 
 (-3.91) (-5.54) (-10.80) (-9.66) (1.42) (1.19) (-26.33) (-30.29) (28.15) (29.78) 
Constant 0.277*** 0.327*** 0.0542 0.118 -0.058*** -0.0486*** -0.00648 0.0472** 0.556*** 0.487*** 
 (4.75) (5.32) (0.66) (1.33) (-6.44) (-8.40) (-0.36) (2.30) (18.28) (10.30) 
Chi-sq stat 
(difference) 2.91 12.54 1.07 4.74 3.72 
           
Adj R-squared 0.046 0.060 0.257            0.176  0.373              0.279  0.141                0.124  0.127             0.134  
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Panel B - Takeover Laws and Earnings Management - Pre-Law ROA Splits      
           
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 DIS_SMTH DIS_SMTH SPINC SPINC DDEQ DDEQ ABNACCR ABNACCR FRQ FRQ 
ROA Poor Good Poor Good Poor Good Poor Good Poor Good 
TREAT*POST 0.0571*** 0.00355 0.0808*** 0.0155** -0.0060*** -0.00219 0.0203*** 0.00647* -0.0488*** -0.00840* 
  (3.98) (0.30) (6.04) (2.37) (-2.90) (-1.45) (4.63) (1.87) (-8.33) (-1.80) 
LNTOTASS 0.00150 -0.00276 0.0162*** 0.000217 0.00350*** 0.00263*** 0.0000519 0.000140 0.00220** 0.00368*** 
 (0.57) (-1.17) (6.83) (0.14) (10.96) (9.23) (0.11) (0.31) (2.29) (4.39) 
BM -0.00292* -0.0108*** 0.0118*** 0.0066*** 0.00102*** 0.00091*** -0.000825 0.0000157 0.000685 0.00296*** 
 (-1.72) (-8.39) (6.47) (3.90) (3.54) (4.81) (-1.48) (0.03) (1.00) (5.09) 
ROA 0.147*** 0.0359 -0.763*** -0.763*** 0.0571*** 0.0662*** 0.320*** 0.412*** -0.150*** -0.199*** 
 (3.89) (0.74) (-12.25) (-12.38) (7.43) (6.48) (15.05) (17.68) (-7.89) (-9.65) 
STDRETURN -0.190*** -0.252*** 0.0862** 0.183*** -0.0663*** -0.0645*** 0.0477*** 0.0462*** -0.0515*** -0.0979*** 
 (-4.90) (-5.93) (2.32) (5.35) (-10.38) (-10.92) (3.17) (2.89) (-3.14) (-5.52) 
OLD 0.0187 0.00334 0.0235* 0.0143** 0.0135*** 0.00588*** -0.00360 0.000660 0.00206 0.00287 
 (1.20) (0.33) (1.81) (2.47) (5.44) (4.61) (-1.06) (0.35) (0.37) (0.81) 
SGROWTH 0.0154 0.0201** -0.068*** -0.038*** -0.005*** -0.0061*** 0.0158** 0.0315*** -0.00849* -0.0236*** 
 (1.50) (2.18) (-7.28) (-5.24) (-2.63) (-3.59) (2.54) (5.12) (-1.69) (-5.17) 
LOSS 0.0284*** -0.0343*** -0.410*** -0.222*** -0.00219** -0.0087*** -0.0107*** 0.000997 0.0421*** 0.0183*** 
 (4.16) (-3.51) (-48.20) (-25.50) (-2.55) (-7.17) (-4.53) (0.31) (14.40) (4.60) 
PCNTCLHLD 0.0778*** 0.0529*** 0.0135 0.0100 0.00284 0.00541*** 0.00348 0.00674* -0.0319*** -0.0154*** 
 (4.30) (3.50) (0.83) (1.02) (1.20) (2.99) (0.92) (1.91) (-4.83) (-2.75) 
CF -0.223*** -0.143*** -0.490*** -0.211*** 0.0121* 0.00122 -0.537*** -0.576*** 0.530*** 0.486*** 
 (-5.51) (-4.06) (-11.64) (-8.23) (1.78) (0.21) (-25.45) (-31.52) (27.48) (29.98) 
Constant 0.284*** 0.373*** 0.00261 0.135* -0.114*** -0.0508*** 0.0207 -0.00815 0.491*** 0.564*** 
 (3.74) (6.38) (0.03) (1.70) (-25.38) (-8.16) (1.19) (-0.39) (15.11) (13.14) 
Chi-sq stat 
(difference) 8.29 19.31 2.24 6.17 29.27 
           
Adj R-squared 0.050               0.066  0.278            0.087  0.358 0.311 0.129                 0.133  0.143           0.130  
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Panel C - Takeover Laws and Analyst Forecast Properties - Pre-Law Return Splits    
         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ANALYST ANALYST ACCURACY ACCURACY DISPERSION DISPERSION AFQ AFQ 
RETURN Poor Good Poor Good Poor Good Poor Good 
TREAT*POST -1.778*** -0.445** -0.0356*** -0.00249 0.0294*** 0.00828* -0.0457*** -0.00227 
  (-7.34) (-2.39) (-5.61) (-0.44) (4.65) (1.74) (-8.53) (-0.44) 
LNTOTASS 1.920*** 2.364*** 0.00602*** 0.00858*** -0.0112*** -0.0109*** 0.0327*** 0.0314*** 
 (27.11) (34.88) (7.52) (10.22) (-8.93) (-13.09) (26.99) (27.96) 
ROA 5.931*** 11.66*** 0.352*** 0.345*** -0.0237 -0.251*** 0.117*** 0.338*** 
 (6.36) (12.76) (9.20) (11.45) (-0.95) (-8.90) (4.68) (12.54) 
STDRETURN 0.817 4.249*** 0.0347 0.00493 0.0717** 0.0712*** -0.0126 0.00652 
 (1.26) (6.35) (1.46) (0.18) (2.31) (2.88) (-0.63) (0.32) 
SGROWTH -0.00580 0.431*** 0.00928 -0.00101 -0.0267*** -0.0157*** 0.0189*** 0.00588 
 (-0.03) (3.22) (1.47) (-0.17) (-4.02) (-3.05) (3.60) (1.36) 
EARNSURP -0.963*** -0.209* -0.270*** -0.220*** 0.0351*** 0.00394 -0.104*** -0.0653*** 
 (-7.08) (-1.95) (-26.25) (-30.22) (4.70) (1.45) (-23.88) (-22.69) 
OLD 0.0184 -0.190 -0.0348*** -0.00654* 0.0245** 0.00885** -0.0675*** -0.0248*** 
 (0.03) (-0.77) (-5.55) (-1.77) (2.56) (2.03) (-6.90) (-4.15) 
Constant -3.708*** -7.244*** -0.0809*** -0.125*** 0.133*** 0.126*** 0.474*** 0.409*** 
 (-3.82) (-8.79) (-3.49) (-6.41) (4.81) (9.30) (20.62) (22.26) 
Chi-sq stat 
(difference) 19.12 15.25 7.19 34.05 
Adj R-squared 0.428 0.456 0.362 0.341 0.062 0.089 0.265 0.277 
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Panel D - Takeover Laws and Analyst Forecast Properties - Pre-Law ROA Splits    
         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ANALYST ANALYST ACCURACY ACCURACY DISPERSION DISPERSION AFQ AFQ 
ROA Poor Good Poor Good Poor Good Poor Good 
TREAT*POST -1.873*** -0.484** -0.0374*** -0.0134*** 0.0362*** 0.00797** -0.0514*** -0.0110** 
  (-8.52) (-2.32) (-4.68) (-2.78) (4.94) (2.06) (-9.13) (-2.30) 
LNTOTASS 2.035*** 2.526*** 0.00684*** 0.00837*** -0.0158*** -0.0122*** 0.0335*** 0.0358*** 
 (33.78) (32.03) (8.48) (9.66) (-13.37) (-15.80) (32.63) (28.44) 
ROA 2.224*** 13.43*** 0.344*** 0.314*** 0.0741*** -0.284*** 0.0163 0.431*** 
 (3.64) (12.79) (10.10) (11.32) (3.56) (-9.27) (0.92) (13.05) 
STDRETURN 1.872*** 6.575*** 0.0595** -0.0392 0.0422 0.0632*** 0.0388** 0.0135 
 (3.72) (8.51) (2.51) (-1.53) (1.47) (2.76) (2.19) (0.61) 
SGROWTH 0.539*** 0.161 0.00851 -0.000753 -0.0207*** -0.0211*** 0.0154*** 0.00602 
 (3.87) (1.11) (1.22) (-0.15) (-3.18) (-4.47) (3.31) (1.36) 
EARNSURP -0.583*** -0.259** -0.257*** -0.219*** 0.00973** 0.0111*** -0.0797*** -0.0788*** 
 (-5.15) (-2.12) (-30.27) (-27.18) (2.00) (3.59) (-22.51) (-24.34) 
OLD 0.114 -0.275 -0.0306*** -0.00769*** 0.0283*** 0.00220 -0.0560*** -0.0139*** 
 (0.33) (-1.46) (-4.92) (-3.00) (4.12) (0.67) (-7.60) (-3.18) 
Constant -4.453*** -8.669*** -0.0787*** -0.121*** 0.173*** 0.153*** 0.453*** 0.360*** 
 (-4.40) (-10.79) (-3.98) (-5.58) (6.54) (10.92) (19.22) (19.18) 
Chi-sq stat 
(difference) 21.12 6.61 11.66 29.98 
Adj R-squared 0.445 0.455 0.355 0.337 0.067 0.101 0.259 0.280 
 
Table 6 presents results to difference-in-differences estimations of the effect of takeover laws on transparency. The dependent variables in Panels A and B are the earnings management variables from 
Table 3, while the dependent variables in Panels C and D are the analyst forecast properties variables from Table 4. For each test, the left column presents results for firms with poor ex ante performance 
(below median firm yearly return in Panels A and C and below median firm ROA in Panels B and D) and the right column presents results for the opposite (above median performance measures in their 
respective panels). The main explanatory variable is the interaction TREAT*POST, which equals 1 if the firm is located in a country that implemented a takeover law during the sample period, and if the 
observation was from after initiation of such law. The chi-squared test statistic of the differences in the coefficients for TREAT*POST between high and low performance firms are presented at the 
bottom of the table. Each estimation contains country, industry, and year fixed effects; t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors at the firm level. All continuous unranked 
nonlogarithmic variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All detailed variable definitions and 
calculations are in Appendix A. 
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Table 7. Takeover Laws and Opacity – CEO Turnover Risk Splits 
Panel A - Takeover Laws and Earnings Management - Pre-Law Turnover Probability Splits     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 DIS_SMTH DIS_SMTH SPINC SPINC DDEQ DDEQ ABNACCR ABNACCR FRQ FRQ 
TURNOVER 
RISK Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High 
TREAT*POST 0.0118 0.0432*** 0.0171** 0.0768*** -0.00195 -0.00653*** 0.00405 0.0242*** -0.0119** -0.0459*** 
  (0.97) (3.04) (2.00) (6.02) (-1.32) (-3.07) (1.21) (5.35) (-2.49) (-7.82) 
LNTOTASS -0.00593* -0.000834 -0.00179 0.0104*** 0.004*** 0.00303*** -0.00112* 0.000170 0.008*** 0.00333*** 
 (-1.77) (-0.32) (-0.80) (4.39) (8.77) (9.23) (-1.71) (0.35) (6.57) (3.48) 
BM -0.0091*** -0.005*** 0.00716*** 0.0130*** 0.0012*** 0.000826*** -0.000237 -0.000148 0.0035*** 0.000685 
 (-5.23) (-3.34) (2.92) (7.71) (3.95) (3.49) (-0.37) (-0.28) (4.89) (1.06) 
ROA 0.0571 0.164*** -0.990*** -0.955*** 0.04*** 0.0697*** 0.426*** 0.323*** -0.164*** -0.133*** 
 (1.06) (4.19) (-11.95) (-12.81) (4.69) (9.10) (16.50) (15.36) (-6.92) (-6.72) 
STDRETURN -0.262*** -0.163*** 0.158*** 0.169*** -0.07*** -0.0630*** 0.0498*** 0.0373** -0.086*** -0.0777*** 
 (-5.53) (-4.14) (3.66) (4.45) (-10.52) (-10.19) (2.73) (2.53) (-4.25) (-4.75) 
OLD -0.00833 0.0155 0.0291*** 0.0286** 0.0057*** 0.00900*** 0.00418 0.00204 0.00550 -0.0105* 
 (-0.54) (0.93) (3.35) (2.14) (2.70) (3.86) (1.46) (0.66) (0.97) (-1.86) 
SGROWTH 0.0122 0.0265*** -0.0346*** -0.0731*** -0.0061*** -0.00549*** 0.0293*** 0.0257*** -0.023*** -0.0165*** 
 (1.15) (2.75) (-3.57) (-8.02) (-3.15) (-3.40) (4.07) (4.11) (-4.06) (-3.48) 
LOSS -0.0138 0.0318*** -0.275*** -0.382*** -0.0061*** -0.00274*** -0.00371 -0.0073*** 0.0266*** 0.0345*** 
 (-1.45) (4.29) (-26.90) (-39.82) (-6.49) (-3.02) (-1.25) (-2.96) (6.78) (10.98) 
PCNTCLHLD 0.0524*** 0.0790*** 0.0220* -0.0125 0.00323 0.0000593 0.00635* 0.00842** -0.025*** -0.029*** 
 (3.05) (4.59) (1.80) (-0.80) (1.61) (0.03) (1.70) (2.25) (-3.81) (-4.64) 
CF -0.164*** -0.222*** -0.377*** -0.442*** 0.00921 0.000000865 -0.576*** -0.545*** 0.523*** 0.531*** 
 (-4.05) (-5.78) (-9.93) (-11.39) (1.45) (0.00) (-27.98) (-27.64) (27.28) (29.51) 
Constant 0.308*** 0.297*** 0.149* 0.0904 -0.048*** -0.0889*** 0.0337 0.0119 0.486*** 0.535*** 
 (5.58) (4.40) (1.77) (1.21) (-7.16) (-5.38) (1.48) (0.72) (12.40) (13.04) 
Chi-sq stat 
(difference) 2.85 15.16 3.16 12.88 20.13 
           
Adj R-squared 0.059                0.053  0.143                 0.257  0.323             0.341  0.137           0.133  0.127 0.133 
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Panel B - Takeover Laws and Analyst Forecast Properties - Pre-Law Turnover Probability Splits   
         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ANALYST ANALYST ACCURACY ACCURACY DISPERSION DISPERSION AFQ AFQ 
TURNOVER RISK Low High Low High Low High Low High 
TREAT*POST -0.639*** -1.645*** -0.00838 -0.0307*** 0.0167*** 0.0222*** -0.0176*** -0.0396*** 
  (-3.52) (-7.07) (-1.30) (-5.32) (3.29) (3.89) (-3.14) (-7.75) 
LNTOTASS 2.031*** 2.305*** 0.0115*** 0.00779*** -0.0160*** -0.0133*** 0.0360*** 0.0363*** 
 (23.15) (34.72) (8.91) (8.56) (-10.44) (-12.38) (20.54) (31.55) 
ROA 12.67*** 9.639*** 0.360*** 0.361*** -0.358*** -0.0697*** 0.477*** 0.121*** 
 (9.94) (9.99) (9.71) (10.69) (-7.52) (-3.06) (10.70) (5.65) 
STDRETURN 5.530*** 1.447** 0.0297 0.0315 0.0408 0.0924*** 0.0660*** -0.0207 
 (7.90) (2.27) (1.27) (1.25) (1.32) (3.73) (2.77) (-1.15) 
SGROWTH 0.181 0.732*** 0.00148 0.00120 -0.0275*** -0.0239*** 0.00653 0.0197*** 
 (1.04) (4.89) (0.21) (0.21) (-3.39) (-4.79) (1.01) (4.68) 
EARNSURP -0.269** -0.350*** -0.206*** -0.255*** 0.00917** 0.00794** -0.0742*** -0.0785*** 
 (-2.37) (-2.81) (-22.30) (-33.06) (2.09) (2.17) (-18.81) (-25.11) 
OLD -0.732*** -0.0453 -0.0109*** -0.0211*** 0.0136*** 0.0202*** -0.0304*** -0.0577*** 
 (-3.03) (-0.11) (-2.63) (-4.55) (2.67) (3.15) (-4.61) (-7.70) 
Constant -5.332*** -6.013*** -0.178*** -0.0791*** 0.174*** 0.130*** 0.368*** 0.446*** 
 (-6.59) (-6.51) (-6.10) (-5.37) (6.66) (8.44) (16.01) (24.03) 
Chi-sq stat 
(difference) 11.68 6.69 0.52 8.41 
Adj R-squared 0.423 0.429 0.304 0.373 0.087 0.067 0.222 0.295 
 
Table 7 presents results to difference-in-differences estimations of the effect of takeover laws on transparency. The dependent variables in Panel A are the earnings management variables from Table 3, 
while the dependent variables in Panel B are the analyst forecast properties variables from Table 4. For each test, the left column presents results for firms with low ex ante turnover risk (below median 
turnover probability) and the right column presents results for the opposite (above median turnover probability). The main explanatory variable is the interaction TREAT*POST, which equals 1 if the 
firm is located in a country that implemented a takeover law during the sample period, and if the observation was from after initiation of such law. The chi-squared test statistic of the differences in the 
coefficients for TREAT*POST between high and low turnover risk firms are presented at the bottom of the table. Each estimation contains country, industry, and year fixed effects; t-statistics are in 
parentheses and are based on robust standard errors at the firm level. All continuous unranked nonlogarithmic variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All detailed variable definitions and calculations are in Appendix A. 
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Table 8. Takeover Laws and Opacity – Investor Protection Splits 
 
 Anti-Self-Dealing Index Legal Origin (Common law vs. Code law) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE FRQ FRQ AFQ AFQ FRQ FRQ AFQ AFQ 
INVESTOR PROTECTION High Low High Low High Low High Low 
TREAT*POST -0.0177*** -0.0289*** -0.0166*** -0.0287*** -0.00132 -0.0332*** -0.0306*** -0.0211*** 
  (-2.83) (-5.43) (-2.98) (-5.05) (-0.14) (-7.70) (-3.48) (-4.87) 
Chi-sq stat (difference) 1.87 2.34 9.04 0.94 
         
Observations 12126 31979 11085 38429 5193 38912 4784 44730 
Adj R-squared 0.101 0.132 0.275 0.249 0.117 0.121 0.284 0.247 
 
Table 8 presents results to difference-in-differences estimations of the effect of takeover laws on transparency. The dependent variables are the aggregate financial reporting quality (FRQ) in Columns 1-
2 and 5-6, and the aggregate analyst forecast quality (AFQ) in Columns 3-4 and 7-8. For each test, the left column presents results for firms from countries with high quality investor protection and the 
right column presents results for firms that are from countries with poor investor protection. Investor protection is measured by the ASDI index from Djankov et al. (2008) in Columns 1-4 and by a 
common law indicator in Columns 5-8. Firms with above median ASDI or from a common law country are categorized as high quality investor protection, and firms with below median ASDI or from a 
code law country are categorized as low quality investor protection. The main explanatory variable is the interaction TREAT*POST, which equals 1 if the firm is located in a country that implemented a 
takeover law during the sample period, and if the observation was from after initiation of such law. The chi-squared test statistic of the differences in the coefficients for TREAT*POST are presented at 
the bottom of the table. Each estimation contains country, industry, and year fixed effects; t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors at the firm level. All continuous unranked 
nonlogarithmic variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All detailed variable definitions and 
calculations are in Appendix A. 
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Table 9.  Takeover Laws and Opacity – Growth Strategy Splits 
 
Panel A - Takeover Laws and Earnings Management - Growth Splits      
           
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 DIS_SMTH DIS_SMTH SPINC SPINC DDEQ DDEQ ABNACCR ABNACCR FRQ FRQ 
GROWTH 
STRATEGY Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
TREAT*POST 0.0337* 0.000774 0.0722*** 0.117*** -0.0072** -0.00621 0.0175*** 0.00815 -0.0372*** -0.0376*** 
  (1.65) (0.02) (4.52) (3.54) (-2.40) (-1.37) (2.99) (0.72) (-4.40) (-2.61) 
Chi-sq stat 
(difference) 0.72 1.52 0.03 0.54 0 
           
Observations 11032                2854  12544              3503  8181               1972  11575               3203  11574            3203  
Adj R-squared 0.055                 0.094  0.151               0.161  0.303              0.379  0.141                0.126  0.115            0.151  
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Panel B - Takeover Laws and Analyst Forecast Properties - Growth Splits 
         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ANALYST ANALYST ACCURACY ACCURACY DISPERSION DISPERSION AFQ AFQ 
GROWTH 
STRATEGY Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
TREAT*POST -2.118*** -2.205*** -0.0302*** -0.00545 0.0350*** 0.0328*** -0.0283*** -0.0453*** 
  (-5.11) (-3.59) (-2.90) (-0.25) (3.13) (2.71) (-3.03) (-3.17) 
Chi-sq stat 
(difference) 0.01 1.09 0.02 1 
         
Observations 10151 3547 10151 3547 6593 2770 10151 3547 
Adj R-squared 0.457 0.433 0.377 0.373 0.065 0.120 0.266 0.270 
 
Table 9 presents results to difference-in-differences estimations of the effect of takeover laws on transparency. The dependent variables in Panel A are the earnings management variables from Table 3, 
while the dependent variables in Panel B are the analyst forecast properties variables from Table 4. For each test, the left column presents results for firms pursuing growth and the right column presents 
results for non-growth firms, where growth firms are defined as firms that experience positive country- and industry-adjusted growth in four variables: total assets, PP&E, cost of goods sold, and SG&A 
expenses. The main explanatory variable is the interaction TREAT*POST, which equals 1 if the firm is located in a country that implemented a takeover law during the sample period, and if the 
observation was from after initiation of such law. The chi-squared test statistic of the differences in the coefficients for TREAT*POST are presented at the bottom of the table. Each estimation contains 
country, industry, and year fixed effects; t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors at the firm level. All continuous unranked nonlogarithmic variables are truncated at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All detailed variable definitions and calculations are in Appendix A. 
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Table 10.  Takeover Laws and Opacity – Share Issuance Splits 
 
Panel A - Takeover Laws and Earnings Management - SEO Splits       
           
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 DIS_SMTH DIS_SMTH SPINC SPINC DDEQ DDEQ ABNACCR ABNACCR FRQ FRQ 
SEO Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
TREAT*POST 0.0142 0.0274*** 0.0165 0.0537*** 0.00128 -0.0045*** -0.00274 0.0141*** -0.0312 -0.0293*** 
  (0.20) (2.96) (0.26) (7.04) (0.12) (-3.42) (-0.07) (5.09) (-1.05) (-7.87) 
Chi-sq stat 
(difference) 0.04 0.37 0.32 0.2 0 
           
Observations 1038 40127 1406 51286 757            28570 1100             43006 1100 43005 
Adj R-squared 0.034 0.045 0.202 0.206 0.355         0.326 0.125            0.131 0.133 0.118 
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Panel B - Takeover Laws and Analyst Forecast Properties – SEO Splits    
         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ANALYST ANALYST ACCURACY ACCURACY DISPERSION DISPERSION AFQ AFQ 
SEO Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
TREAT*POST -2.086** -1.229*** -0.0299 -0.0193*** -0.00381 0.0180*** -0.0169 -0.0235*** 
  (-2.02) (-7.93) (-1.16) (-4.55) (-0.23) (4.68) (-0.80) (-6.27) 
Chi-sq stat (difference) 0.73 0.17 1.83 0.1 
 
        
Observations 1603 47911 1603 47911 1294 33442 1603 47911 
Adj R-squared 0.556 0.419 0.320 0.341 0.029 0.066 0.201 0.249 
 
 
Table 10 presents results to difference-in-differences estimations of the effect of takeover laws on transparency. The dependent variables in Panel A are the earnings management variables from Table 3, 
while the dependent variables in Panel B are the analyst forecast properties variables from Table 4. For each test, the left column presents results for firms having a SEO during the fiscal year, while the 
right column presents results for firms that did not make any issuances. The main explanatory variable is the interaction TREAT*POST, which equals 1 if the firm is located in a country that 
implemented a takeover law during the sample period, and if the observation was from after initiation of such law. The chi-squared test statistic of the differences in the coefficients for TREAT*POST 
are presented at the bottom of the table. Each estimation contains country, industry, and year fixed effects; t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors at the firm level. All 
continuous unranked nonlogarithmic variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All detailed variable 
definitions and calculations are in Appendix A.
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Table 11.  Controls for Confounding Channels 
Panel A - Controlling for Confounding Channels - Earnings Management  
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 DIS_SMTHC SPINC DDEQ ABNACCR FRQ 
Prediction (+) (+) (-) (+) (-) 
TREAT*POST 0.0265*** 0.0473*** -0.00358*** 0.0114*** -0.0245*** 
 (2.74) (5.96) (-2.62) (3.97) (-6.29) 
LNTOTASS 0.000102 0.0155*** 0.00293*** -0.000292 0.00212*** 
 (0.06) (10.29) (15.35) (-0.95) (3.43) 
BM -0.00157 0.0178*** 0.00159*** -0.000619 -0.000413 
 (-0.99) (11.63) (5.67) (-1.26) (-0.68) 
ROA 0.113*** -0.778*** 0.0645*** 0.357*** -0.172*** 
 (3.98) (-18.22) (11.19) (23.84) (-12.95) 
STDRETURN -0.204*** 0.164*** -0.0686*** 0.0494*** -0.0834*** 
 (-7.01) (6.30) (-15.07) (4.67) (-7.01) 
OLD 0.00521 0.0237*** 0.00887*** -0.000515 0.00388 
 (0.69) (4.61) (8.77) (-0.35) (1.48) 
SGROWTH 0.0161** -0.0623*** -0.00671*** 0.0263*** -0.0162*** 
 (2.22) (-10.33) (-5.04) (6.04) (-4.73) 
LOSS 0.0179*** -0.308*** -0.00445*** -0.00694*** 0.0254*** 
 (3.18) (-48.66) (-6.50) (-3.74) (10.99) 
PCNTCLHLD 0.0613*** -0.00947 0.00501*** 0.00354 -0.0203*** 
 (5.28) (-0.99) (3.47) (1.37) (-4.75) 
CF -0.210*** -0.350*** 0.00572 -0.549*** 0.509*** 
 (-8.00) (-14.53) (1.29) (-41.29) (42.30) 
CGR 0.0281*** 0.00603 -0.00108 0.00994*** -0.0213*** 
 (3.43) (0.81) (-1.04) (4.50) (-6.43) 
SHORTLEGAL 0.0538*** -0.0370*** 0.00252 0.00409 -0.00903* 
 (4.10) (-3.36) (1.23) (1.05) (-1.68) 
ITLAW    -0.0760*** 0.00918 
    (-11.40) (0.62) 
GOODINVPROT 0.124*** -0.0869** 0.00205 -0.0131 -0.0317* 
 (2.99) (-2.21) (0.30) (-1.56) (-1.75) 
Constant 0.306*** 0.0754 -0.0507*** 0.0954*** 0.519*** 
 (7.22) (1.30) (-9.48) (8.17) (21.88) 
      
Observations 37837 47877 27036 40189 40188 
Adj R-squared 0.044 0.214 0.344 0.137 0.124 
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Panel B - Controlling for Confounding Channels - Analyst Forecast Properties 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ANALYST ACCURACY DISPERSION AFQ 
Prediction (-) (-) (+) (-) 
TREAT*POST -0.735*** -0.0177*** 0.0103*** -0.0193*** 
 (-4.76) (-3.96) (2.60) (-4.99) 
LNTOTASS 2.098*** 0.00796*** -0.0105*** 0.0324*** 
 (44.34) (14.14) (-15.70) (40.83) 
ROA 8.656*** 0.307*** -0.127*** 0.215*** 
 (14.27) (14.66) (-6.98) (11.99) 
STDRETURN 3.303*** -0.00117 0.0724*** 0.0140 
 (7.36) (-0.07) (3.79) (1.01) 
SGROWTH 0.623*** 0.00161 -0.0253*** 0.0171*** 
 (5.94) (0.39) (-6.39) (5.09) 
EARNSURP -0.261*** -0.234*** 0.00864*** -0.0815*** 
 (-3.05) (-41.01) (3.19) (-34.54) 
OLD -0.558*** -0.00861*** 0.0107*** -0.0222*** 
 (-4.00) (-3.78) (3.77) (-6.50) 
CGR -1.719*** -0.00536 0.0273*** -0.0161*** 
 (-12.99) (-1.56) (7.73) (-4.71) 
SHORTLEGAL 1.115*** -0.00951* -0.00557 0.00688 
 (5.69) (-1.92) (-1.17) (1.41) 
GOODINVPROT -0.313 0.0686*** -0.0664*** 0.0831*** 
 (-0.63) (5.63) (-5.42) (4.88) 
Constant -4.596*** -0.113*** 0.129*** 0.414*** 
 (-8.00) (-7.96) (10.09) (29.98) 
     
Observations 45456 45456 31869 45456 
Adj R-squared 0.438 0.337 0.065 0.251 
 
Table 11 presents results to difference-in-differences estimations of the effect of takeover laws on various earnings management and analyst 
forecast property measures. The dependent variables are the transparency proxies used in Tables 3 and 4, and the main explanatory variable is 
TREAT*POST, and control variables are the same as in Tables 3 and 4. Additional controls are included for corporate governance reforms, short 
selling laws, insider trading laws (where multicollinearity is not a problem), and a good investor protection dummy to account for potential 
confounding channel, in which the good investor protection dummy is a combination of ASDI and the common law indicator from Table 8. Panel 
A presents the earnings management results and Panel B presents the analyst forecast properties results. Each estimation contains country, 
industry, and year fixed effects; t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors at the firm level. All continuous unranked 
nonlogarithmic variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. All detailed variable definitions and calculations are in Appendix A. 
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TABLE 12.  Other Transparency Proxies 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 BIG5 BIG5 AVOL AVOL AVAR AVAR 
Prediction (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) 
TREAT*POST -0.0543*** -0.0567*** -0.108*** -0.111*** -0.147*** -0.115** 
  (-6.12) (-6.64) (-4.43) (-3.86) (-3.51) (-2.42) 
LNTOTASS 0.0414*** -0.0197*** 0.0278*** -0.00955 0.151*** 0.0184 
 (17.58) (-4.06) (9.40) (-0.63) (22.43) (0.75) 
BM 0.00769*** 0.00187 0.00328 0.0117*** -0.00630 0.00353 
 (5.12) (1.64) (1.29) (2.72) (-1.31) (0.43) 
LEV -0.0713*** -0.0788*** -0.0279 0.0699 -0.275*** -0.171* 
 (-4.55) (-5.21) (-1.29) (1.23) (-5.88) (-1.73) 
ROA 0.0659*** -0.0111 0.198*** 0.217** 0.480*** 0.385** 
 (2.94) (-0.68) (2.97) (2.29) (3.81) (2.43) 
INVTA -0.0575* -0.0308     
 (-1.94) (-0.96)     
ARTA 0.0932*** 0.00813     
 (3.49) (0.31)     
OLD -0.0181**      
 (-2.05)      
CF 0.168*** -0.0251     
 (6.15) (-1.41)     
SGROWTH   0.106*** 0.100*** 0.174*** 0.135*** 
   (6.86) (5.23) (5.66) (3.86) 
STDRETURN   0.0336 -0.103 1.301*** 0.393** 
   (0.51) (-1.23) (9.62) (2.56) 
LOSS   -0.0534*** -0.0430*** -0.0552** -0.0296 
   (-4.28) (-2.83) (-2.34) (-1.12) 
EADELAY   -0.00271*** -0.00284*** -0.00539*** -0.00492*** 
   (-16.97) (-13.95) (-18.35) (-14.09) 
PCNTCLHLD   -0.143*** -0.174*** -0.700*** -0.555*** 
   (-6.40) (-3.70) (-14.89) (-6.72) 
Constant 0.277*** 0.672*** -0.0864 0.162 -0.979*** -0.109 
 (3.51) (11.98) (-1.19) (1.56) (-6.95) (-0.65) 
Fixed Effects C, I, Y F, Y C, I, Y F, Y C, I, Y F, Y        
Observations 91153 91153 50802 50802 63037 63037 
Adjusted R-sq 0.220 0.657 0.061 0.111 0.077 0.154 
 
Table 12 presents results to difference-in-differences estimations of the effect of takeover laws on various transparency measures. The dependent 
variables are the Big 5 auditor indicator, abnormal trading volume, and abnormal return variance, and the main explanatory variable is 
TREAT*POST. Models in columns 1, 3, and 5 contain country, industry, and year fixed effects, while models in columns 2, 4, and 6 contain firm 
and year fixed effects; t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors at the firm level. All continuous unranked 
nonlogarithmic variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. All detailed variable definitions and calculations are in Appendix A.   
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Table 13.  Sensitivity Analyses 
      
 Reduced Sample Period Drop post-2004 
Drop year, year before 
law  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 FRQ AFQ FRQ AFQ FRQ AFQ 
TREAT*POST -0.0322*** -0.0239*** -0.0261*** -0.0252*** -0.0278*** -0.0285*** 
  (-8.17) (-5.90) (-6.04) (-5.64) (-6.28) (-6.55) 
 
Observations 41286 46649 21650 32902 42052 47393 
Adj R-squared 0.119 0.250 0.103 0.242 0.119 0.253 
 
Table 13 present results to difference-in-differences estimations of the effect of takeover laws on aggregate financial reporting quality, FRQ, and 
aggregate analyst forecast quality, AFQ. The main explanatory variable is the interaction TREAT*POST, which equals 1 if the firm is located in a 
country that implemented a takeover law during the sample period, and if the observation was from after initiation of such law. Control variables 
are the same as depicted in Tables 3-4 but are not shown for parsimony. Models in columns 1 and 2 limit the sample period to three years pre- 
and post-takeover law to remove the possibility of effects far before or after passage of these laws, models in columns 3 and 4 limit the sample to 
pre-2004 to avoid the possible confounding effect of the EU Takeover Directive, models in columns 5 and 6 drop the year and the year prior to 
law initiation to remove doubts about when during the fiscal year the law was passed and about whether firms could preemptively change their 
transparency. All estimations contain country, industry, and year fixed effects. t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on robust standard 
errors at the firm level. All continuous unranked nonlogarithmic variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Asterisks ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All detailed variable definitions and calculations are in Appendix A. 
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